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THE WHOLESALE PROBLEM WITH CONGRESS:  
THE DANGEROUS DECLINE OF EXPERTISE IN 
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Rachel E. Barkow* 
 
It is no surprise to anyone that Congress has become a hyperpartisan 
battleground where little effort is expended to promote policies that work for 
Americans.  While Congress has always viewed policy issues through the 
lens of party politics, the role of nonpartisan expertise in the legislative 
process is at an all-time low.  The disrespect for experts is growing across 
society, but the decline in their use is particularly troubling in Congress 
because it exacerbates deficiencies that are inherent to the legislative 
process.  Congress passes laws of general applicability and does not sit in 
judgment of specific applications of the law.  Whether Congress does a good 
job setting those general policies depends on the process it uses for doing so.  
Sometimes, though increasingly rarely, Congress gathers the relevant facts 
and arguments about different aspects of a problem before acting.  More 
often, legislators have specific outlier problems or prototypes in mind when 
they draft legislation, and if there is not an expert fact-finding process in 
place to study a proposal, cognitive biases may go unchecked. 
This Article sets out to document the declining respect for expertise in 
Congress, the implications for policymaking given the wholesale nature of 
the legislative process, and some possible ways to account for the decline of 
expertise in the legislative process.  Part I details the role nonpartisan 
experts have played in the legislative process over time and documents the 
various ways that experts have fallen out of favor in Congress.  Part II 
explains why this decline of expert involvement in legislation is particularly 
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troubling given the way Congress operates as a body making wholesale 
policy with little individualized feedback on how its policies are applying to 
real-world scenarios.  Part III then turns to the question of what, if anything, 
could or should be done about it.  While Congress could, in theory, shift 
course, that seems unlikely.  Throughout its history, Congress has cared 
about nonpartisan expertise when it worried about presidential overreach.  
But with parties dominating the political landscape, there is little likelihood 
that Congress will care enough about its institutional position relative to the 
executive.  In the absence of legislative reform, Part III therefore considers 
two additional implications of the decline of expertise in the legislative 
process.  First, the decline of internal expertise in the legislative body places 
greater weight on the use of administrative agencies to provide that 
guidance.  Ironically, the U.S. Supreme Court may be toying with a 
revitalization of the nondelegation doctrine at the precise moment that 
delegation is most urgently needed.  Second, courts and other bodies that 
interpret statutes could consider the relationship between statutory meaning 
and Congress’s consultation with nonpartisan experts to help address 
statutory ambiguities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While Americans seem deeply divided over just about everything, one area 
of common ground is the view that Congress seems broken.1  There was a 
time when legislators reached across the aisle to work together, and many 
pieces of landmark legislation tackled the most fundamental issues facing 
 
 1. Julia Manchester, Congress Mired in Low Approval Ratings, HILL (Dec. 14, 2017, 
10:15 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/364878-congress-mired-in-low-approval-
ratings [https://perma.cc/24JP-AQXH] (explaining that 2017 was the eighth year 
congressional approval ratings remained below 20 percent). 
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society.2  Now, however, bipartisanship is a rarity.  Because each party views 
every election cycle as a possible opportunity to gain or retain majority status 
in Congress, there is little incentive for cooperation and, instead, partisanship 
rules the day.3  The role of money in campaigns, and thus legislative 
decisionmaking, is an order of magnitude greater than in the past.4 
In this climate of hyperpartisanship, it is perhaps no surprise that members 
of Congress have lost interest in hearing or researching what nonpartisan 
subject matter experts have to say about the substance of legislative 
proposals.  This has been particularly true of the Republican Party, which led 
the charge in reducing the role of expert advisers in Congress.5  Both 
Republicans and Democrats in Congress have shifted away from a model in 
which their members develop their own areas of expertise so that others in 
their caucus turn to them for specialized advice.  Instead, party leaders have 
far greater sway than specialized committee chairs or others with relative 
experience or expertise.  While Congress has always viewed policy issues 
through the lens of party and politics, the role of expertise in the legislative 
process is at an all-time low.6 
The decline in the use of experts exacerbates deficiencies that are inherent 
to the legislative process.  Congress passes laws of general applicability and 
does not sit in judgment of specific applications of the law.  Indeed, our 
 
 2. SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 4 (2008) (illustrating 
increased polarization by demonstrating how, in moderate constituencies in the mid-2000s, 
Democrats voted 25 percent more liberally and Republicans 50 percent more conservatively 
than their predecessors had in the 1970s); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold:  
The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 277 (2011) 
(“[M]ost of twentieth century American politics . . . had nothing like the political-party 
polarization that arose and has endured throughout our era . . . .”). 
 3. FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES:  CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN 
70 (2016). 
 4. Drew DeSilver & Patrick van Kessel, As More Money Flows into Campaigns, 
Americans Worry About Its Influence, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 7, 2015), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/07/as-more-money-flows-into-campaigns-
americans-worry-about-its-influence/ [https://perma.cc/76QQ-U5WE] (demonstrating that 
spending on congressional campaigns has more than quadrupled in the past thirty years and 
that outside spending has also dramatically increased in the past ten years); Lobbying Data 
Summary, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ [https://perma.cc/J63K-
WQCQ] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021) (showing how lobbying expenditures tripled in the past 
twenty years, from $1.45 billion in 1998 to $3.3 billion in 2017).  For a history of corporate 
lobbying in the United States, see generally LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS 
LOBBYING (2015). 
 5. See infra notes 103–41 and accompanying text. 
 6. A prominent example was the Republican rejection of the fiscal projections of the 
nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office for the tax reform legislation in 2017. Philip Klein, 
Mick Mulvaney:  The Day of the CBO ‘Has Probably Come and Gone,’ WASH. EXAMINER 
(May 31, 2017, 5:52 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tag/donald-
trump?source=%2Fmick-mulvaney-the-day-of-the-cbo-has-probably-come-and-gone 
[https://perma.cc/TZM2-WWET].  Eight former CBO directors wrote congressional leaders 
to express their concern about the criticism. Letter from Former CBO Directors on the 
Importance of CBO’s Role in the Legislative Process to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House, et 
al. (July 21, 2017). 
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Constitution takes pains to make sure that the legislature does not target 
individuals for specific burdens.7  The judicial and executive powers are 
removed from Congress for precisely that reason, and other constitutional 
provisions have the same aim of making sure Congress does not pick 
particular winners and losers.8  To be sure, even broadly written laws can 
have the effect—intended or unintended—of singling out industries or 
companies or even people for distinct hardship.  But in the main, legislative 
power is about the general, not the specific.  This aspect of the legislative 
branch is often highlighted as a key feature that sets it apart from the 
executive and judicial branches9 and that makes it best suited to establish 
overall policies.10 
But whether Congress does a good job setting those broad policies depends 
on the process it uses for doing so.  Sometimes, though increasingly rarely, 
Congress gathers the relevant facts and arguments about different aspects of 
a problem before acting.11  Other times, legislators tend to have specific 
problems or prototypes in mind when they draft legislation, and if there is 
not an expert fact-finding process in place to study a proposal, erroneous or 
incomplete legislative assumptions may go unchecked.12  Typically, some 
concrete event sparks the legislative interest in the first place, such as a 
high-profile incident, a lobbyist raising a fire alarm about a problem, or other 
constituents pushing for change.13  Whatever provoked legislative interest in 
an issue can dominate how legislators think about the problem thereafter, 
unless the process itself is designed to provide a fuller analysis and to push 
back against any assumptions that lack a factual basis. 
In this regard, legislators are no different from anyone else.  We all use 
heuristics (mental shortcuts) or schemas (cognitive frameworks or mental 
blueprints) that are activated unconsciously and help us organize and 
 
 7. See Evan C. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component of Legislative Generality,  
51 U. RICH. L. REV. 489, 491–92, 543–44 (2017) (describing the aspects of legislative 
generality enshrined in the U.S. Constitution). 
 8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (no bills of attainder or ex post 
facto laws). 
 9. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 91 (2d ed. 1874) 
(“[T]he law is applied by the one, and made by the other . . . .  ‘It is the province of judicial 
power, also, to decide private disputes between or concerning persons; but of legislative power 
to regulate public concerns, and to make laws for the benefit and welfare of the State.’” 
(quoting Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 204 (1818)) (emphasis added)); Karl Loewenstein, 
The Balance Between Legislative and Executive Power:  A Study in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 566, 575 (1938) (arguing that while execution is “the 
application of the general rule to the individual situation,” legislation is “merely instrumental 
to the fulfillment of the objectives of general policy prescribed or dictated by the 
government”). 
 10. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 564–65 (2002). 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
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interpret incoming information to make decisions.14  The danger of heuristics 
and schemas for anyone is that they can also lead us to ignore relevant 
information and instead reinforce preexisting beliefs even when those beliefs 
are mistaken or rely on unsubstantiated stereotypes.15  Schemas are 
particularly powerful in shaping decisions and information in the absence of 
individuating information that shows how people vary from the schema’s 
stereotype.16  In contexts where legislators are getting information on all 
sides of an issue and have expert bodies to help advise them on sorting 
through the facts, they are relatively well positioned to make policies.  But 
where legislators lack expert feedback and get information filtered only 
through partisans, they may end up basing policy on outlier examples and 
end up with solutions that are ill-fitting to most cases and scenarios.  Because 
members of Congress do not see how their policy choices play out across a 
range of individual cases, they may not receive sufficient feedback on how 
statutes are operating across a range of real-world settings in a way that 
meaningfully alters their thinking.  This differs from the executive and 
judicial branches, which are charged with applying laws to particular cases 
and therefore getting feedback across a range of fact patterns.  The demise of 
expertise in Congress is thus particularly dangerous because of the patterns 
of wholesale thinking based on incomplete information that take its place. 
This Article sets out to document the declining respect for expertise in 
Congress, the implications for policymaking given the wholesale nature of 
the legislative process, and some possible ways to approach the 
shortcomings.  Part I details the various ways that experts have fallen out of 
the legislative process and why that should concern us.  Part II explains why 
this decline of expert involvement in legislation is particularly troubling 
given the way Congress operates as a body making wholesale policy with 
little individualized feedback on how its policies are applying to real-world 
scenarios.  Part III then turns to the question of what, if anything, could or 
should be done about it.  One strategy is to consider the political forces that 
led to the decline in expertise in Congress to reverse-engineer a resurgence.  
Because Republicans spearheaded the erosion of information gathering in 
Congress, it will likely take a Democratic effort to bring it back.  With the 
Democrats recently taking over both houses and the presidency, rebuilding 
these institutions could help improve policymaking going forward.  But the 
 
 14. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 98 (2d. ed. 1991).  See 
generally C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition:  Thinking 
Categorically About Others, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 93, 96 (2000); Richard K. Sherwin, The 
Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 700 (1994); Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 
(1974). 
 15. Kendra Cherry, The Role of a Schema in Psychology, VERY WELL (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.verywell.com/what-is-a-schema-2795873 [https://perma.cc/9JWS-PLCR]. 
 16. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160 
(2012); see also Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias:  A Cognitive 
Science Primer for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 278, 
312 (2014). 
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Democrats’ majorities are slim, and it is unclear what they can achieve, 
particularly if they have only a two-year window to accomplish it.  Moreover, 
the main motivation for expert checks in Congress over the years has been a 
desire for Congress to check executive overreach.  With Democrats currently 
controlling both Congress and the presidency, the urgency for this reform 
might not seem pressing. 
Assuming Congress does not shift course or takes only limited action, Part 
III therefore considers two additional implications of the decline of expertise 
in the legislative process.  First, the decline of internal expertise in the 
legislative body places greater weight on the use of administrative agencies 
to provide that guidance.17  Ironically, the U.S. Supreme Court may be toying 
with a revitalization of the nondelegation doctrine at the precise moment that 
delegation is most urgently needed.18  Second, courts and other bodies that 
interpret statutes could consider the relationship between statutory meaning 
and Congress’s consultation with nonpartisan experts to help address 
statutory ambiguities.19 
I.  THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERTISE IN CONGRESS 
In an idealized version of the legislative process, legislators gather facts 
about an issue, deliberate thoughtfully, and make an informed decision about 
the best course of action in the public interest.20  James Madison praised 
republican government for its ability to “refine and enlarge the public views, 
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose 
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose 
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary 
or partial considerations.”21  Good government, according to Madison, 
required two key ingredients:  “first, fidelity to the object of government, 
which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by 
which that object can be best attained.”22  Madison further noted, “[n]o man 
can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a 
sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is 
to legislate.”23  Wisdom and knowledge were thus central to the Framers’ 
vision, and they believed the republican form of government they created 
would foster the accumulation of knowledge and wisdom.24 
 
 17. See infra Parts I.B, III.B.1. 
 18. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
 20. Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review:  A 
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1178–81 (2001). 
 21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 316 (James Madison). 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 274 (James Madison). 
 24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 316 (James Madison) (“Some governments are deficient 
in both [fidelity to the public’s happiness and the knowledge of how to achieve it]; most 
governments are deficient in the first.  I scruple not to assert, that in American governments 
too little attention has been paid to the last.  The federal Constitution avoids this error; and 
 
2021] THE WHOLESALE PROBLEM WITH CONGRESS 1035 
The Supreme Court takes this romanticized view of the legislation process, 
noting its belief that Congress’s “special attribute as a legislative body lies in 
its broader mission to investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may 
be relevant to the resolution of an issue.  One appropriate source is the 
information and expertise that Congress acquires in the consideration and 
enactment of earlier legislation.”25  The Court has observed: 
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of 
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to 
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the 
requisite information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must be 
had to others who do possess it.26 
The Supreme Court’s deference to Congress’s policy decisions is based on a 
vision of the legislative process that finds the relevant information necessary 
to govern so that it makes informed decisions.  As the Court has remarked, 
“[w]e owe Congress’ findings deference in part because the institution ‘is far 
better equipped than the judiciary to “amass and evaluate the vast amounts 
of data” bearing upon’ legislative questions.”27 
A.  The Path Toward Greater Expertise 
The reality of congressional process has never lived up to the romanticized 
version described by the Framers or the Court, but it has been much closer to 
that ideal than what currently takes place.  In the nation’s early history, 
Congress was viewed as “a part-time body with a part-time role in a limited 
federal government.”28  But even with a more limited role and very little 
staff,29 Congress used standing and investigatory committees to gather 
information.30  For example, debates over tariff policy in 1827 saw one of 
the first examples of an investigation being used to proactively shape policy, 
as legislators recognized they needed accurate information about the 
 
what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security 
for the first.”). 
 25. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 572 (1990) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 26. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927). 
 27. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (quoting Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 662, 665–66 (1994) (quoting Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation 
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985))). 
 28. Susan Webb Hammond, Life and Work on the Hill:  Careers, Norms, Staff and 
Informal Caucuses, in CONGRESS RESPONDS TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 73, 74 (Sunil Ahuja 
& Robert Dewhirst eds., 2003). 
 29. While the number of staff slowly increased with the size of the legislature, in 1891 all 
of Congress was served by just 146 staff members, compared to over 20,000 a century later. 
Id. at 79. 
 30. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-324, 
at 144 (1994) (noting early standing committees that still persist today, such as the Committee 
on Elections and the Ways and Means Committee). 
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economic conditions of the country in order to pass effective tariffs.31  
Then-Representative John Quincy Adams expressed a similar view in 1837 
when he commented on the complexity of “banking, exchange, currency, 
circulation and credits” and noted that “what I want most of all, is counsel, 
from those who do know something about it, practically.”32  With greater 
complexity came more committees, and by the mid-1800s, committees had 
become the default point of entry for new legislation.33  Lawmakers who 
serve on committees develop policy knowledge and legislative experience on 
subject matters relating to their committees.34  In a legislative body 
concerned with expertise, rank-and-file members would look to committee 
experts due to their own limited resources and knowledge of substantive 
policy areas.35  And for much of Congress’s history, that is, in fact, how 
things proceeded. 
The twentieth century saw more dramatic institutional changes, and for 
most of the century, those changes favored even greater use of expert facts 
and information.  Congressional staffing increased as members realized “that 
professional help was needed in carrying out congressional responsibilities 
and . . . duties.”36  Progressive Era reforms and mobilization for World War I 
required even greater technical knowledge to be successful,37 so Congress 
delegated more detailed policy implementation to the executive branch and 
public corporations because of their relative informational advantages.38 
Congress also created internal congressional bodies—what Professors 
Jesse Cross and Abbe Gluck refer to as “the Congressional Bureaucracy”—
to provide additional expertise.39  For example, when Congress wanted to 
better track the enormous expenditures on Progressive-Era initiatives in the 
 
 31. James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of 
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 171–77 (1926). 
 32. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-324, at 73. 
 33. See DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS:  HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM 
JURISDICTION 90–91 (1997). 
 34. James M. Curry, Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary 
Congress, 44 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 203, 209 (2019); see also HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 89-250 at 86 (1963) (“Long service on the same 
committees develops in the American legislator an expertise that makes him more than a 
match for the transient department head.”). 
 35. See Curry, supra note 34, at 204 (describing how committees are able to influence 
other members of Congress). 
 36. Hammond, supra note 28, at 81. 
 37. See Roger H. Davidson, The Advent of the Modern Congress:  The Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946, 15 LEGIS. SERIES Q. 357, 359 (1990) (describing the challenges 
of governing in this era). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See generally Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The Congressional Bureaucracy, 168 
U. PA. L. REV. 1541 (2020).  Cross and Gluck include additional internal bodies that assist 
with legislative drafting and nonpolicy work.  Because I am concerned with Congress’s 
substantive policymaking output here, I focus only on the subset of these bodies that offer 
expert advice on substantive policy outcomes. 
 
2021] THE WHOLESALE PROBLEM WITH CONGRESS 1037 
Budget and Accounting Act, 1921,40 it created a Bureau of the Budget (now 
known as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)) in the executive 
branch to give budget estimates to the president, while simultaneously 
creating its own agency, an early iteration of the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), to balance that increased executive control 
with a source of expertise for Congress.41  Congress had been keeping track 
of the country’s finances from the country’s founding, but that effort largely 
consisted of various comptroller or auditor offices in different federal 
departments.42  World War I and its costs prompted Congress to push for 
greater national budgeting and auditing as a response to “public criticism of 
its inability to bring spending under control.”43  Congress thus reorganized 
several auditing procedures then located in the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury into a new agency headed by the comptroller general and known as 
the General Accounting Office, later renamed the Government 
Accountability Office in 2004.44  The GAO serves as the “congressional 
watchdog,” monitoring government spending and issuing legal opinions on 
the use of public funds.45  Congress gave the GAO statutory authority to 
investigate the entire government regarding the distribution and use of public 
funds and vested it with broad access to information from all departments 
and other government entities.46  The GAO reports its findings to Congress 
when ordered by either house or by committees with jurisdictions relating to 
fiscal matters.47  GAO reports, “while sometimes criticized by the offices 
under investigation, are widely regarded as objective and non-partisan and 
are often the basis for constructive change.”48  GAO estimates that its annual 
 
 40. Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (current version codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 41. See MAY HUNTER WILBUR, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., AN EARLY HISTORY OF THE 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 1921–1943, at 10–12 (1988) (describing the creation of the 
GAO), https://www.gao.gov/assets/op-1-hp.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3NK-3UDJ]. 
 42. See id. at 1–9 (describing U.S. fiscal history from the Revolution to the late nineteenth 
century). 
 43. Thomas D. Morgan, The General Accountability Office:  One Hope for Congress to 
Regain Parity of Power with the President, 51 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (1973). 
 44. Congress initially proposed a bill in 1920 that would have made the comptroller 
general removable only by a concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress. See WILBUR, 
supra note 41, at 10–12.  This was particularly important because the then-newly created 
Bureau of the Budget (later OMB) gave the executive much greater powers. FREDERICK M. 
KAISER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., GAO:  GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AND GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE 3 (2008). 
 45. About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/HF5V-GYFE] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); What GAO Does for Congress, 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/for-congress/ 
[https://perma.cc/W8ZQ-4JN3] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).  President Woodrow Wilson 
vetoed that bill because he believed the removal provision was unconstitutional, so Congress 
passed a modified version that made the comptroller general subject to removal by a joint 
resolution that would require the president’s approval. WILBUR, supra note 41, at 11–12. 
 46. See KAISER, supra note 44, at 3–4 (describing the GAO’s statutory authority). 
 47. See id. at 4 (describing the GAO’s reporting obligations). 
 48. Morgan, supra note 43, at 1281–82. 
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reports over the past ten years have saved the federal government $429 
billion.49  A 2015 study found that approximately 80 percent of GAO’s 
recommendations to federal agencies were successfully implemented.50 
In 1926, Congress created the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) as part 
of the Revenue Act of 1926.51  This body provides expert analysis of tax 
legislation so Congress can anticipate the revenues that will be generated.  As 
with the GAO, Congress created the JCT because of a concern that, 
otherwise, the executive had too much control over tax policy.52  The JCT 
and its staff are “essential to Congress’s tax process,” with one commentator 
noting that the head of the JCT has had a greater influence on tax legislation 
“than the President, the Secretary of State, the assistant secretary in charge 
of taxation, [and] the chairmen of the tax-writing committees in Congress—
separately or combined.”53 
Even bigger changes came with World War II and the New Deal, which 
greatly increased the size of the national budget and the complexity of 
government.54  Congress organized a Joint Committee on the Organization 
of Congress to study what changes Congress needed to better handle the 
demands of modern legislation and supervise the executive branch.  The 
Organization Committee’s staff director noted this inquiry was necessary 
because “members [were] bewildered and harassed by multiplying technical 
problems and local pressures.”55  One senator, wary of the outsourcing of 
expertise to lobbyists and other outside advisers, told the Committee that he 
felt Congress “should have a staff on our committees and [Congress] should 
do away with the downtown-loaned experts, who are always biased 
individuals.”56  Congress was particularly concerned that it was too reliant 
on the executive branch for opinions and advice.  In a notable floor speech, 
Representative Everett M. Dirksen urged his colleagues:  “Let us spend a 
 
 49. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 2020 ANNUAL REPORT:  ADDITIONAL 
OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE FRAGMENTATION, OVERLAP, AND DUPLICATION AND ACHIEVE 
BILLIONS IN FINANCIAL BENEFITS (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-440sp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6NY9-FW8K]. 
 50. See Daniel Byler et al., Accountability Quantified, DELOITTE:  INSIGHTS  
(Feb. 18, 2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/analytics/text-analytics-and-
gao-reports.html [https://perma.cc/NB5B-RCT9] (“Are GAO recommendations an effective 
way to drive targeted change within agencies?  Yes.  Overall, during the period between 1983 
and 2008, 81 percent of GAO’s recommendations were successfully completed by federal 
agencies.”). 
 51. Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 1203, 44 Stat. 9, 128 (current version codified in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.). 
 52. George K. Yin, James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, the “Greatest Tax Suit in the History 
of the World,” and the Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and Its Staff, 66 TAX L. 
REV. 787, 838–49 (2013). 
 53. Cross & Gluck, supra note 39, at 1580. 
 54. Davidson, supra note 37, at 359–60. 
 55. Id. at 360. 
 56. Lee Drutman & Steven M. Teles, Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists Instead of 
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little money on ourselves; let us provide legislative tools to get the facts, the 
data, the information, and then control, supervise, and survey the operations 
of the Government.”57 
Congress responded by passing the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1946,58 a law that had widespread bipartisan support and remade the 
congressional committee system.59  Before the Act, there were eighty-one 
standing committees with unclear and overlapping jurisdictions.60  After the 
Act, there were thirty-four committees with much more specific jurisdictions 
and delineation of responsibilities.61  Congressional staff increased with four 
expert staff members for each committee, as well as greater assistance for 
legislative reference and bill drafting.62 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 also took the Legislative 
Research Service, which was a small research agency that began in the 
Library of Congress in 1914, and turned it into its own legislative agency 
with an increased staff of experts and a larger mandate to assist congressional 
committees.63  The Legislative Reorganization Act of 197064 provided this 
agency with even more resources and renamed it the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) to reflect the more prominent role the Act envisioned for the 
agency in helping to provide congressional oversight65 and to provide it with 
greater “capacity to evaluate the policy results of its work.”66  The impetus 
for these changes was a concern that “Congress was again seen as falling 
behind the executive branch in its powers and performance and was again 
 
 57. Cross & Gluck, supra note 39, at 1557. 
 58. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (current version codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 59. Opposition came largely from Democrats who chaired committees that were being 
eliminated by the legislation. Davidson, supra note 37, at 364. 
 60. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES:  U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1901-1950/The-
Legislative-Reorganization-Act-of-1946/ [https://perma.cc/F4L2-FX3P] (last visited Oct. 29, 
2021). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Davidson, supra note 37, at 367.  Not all increased staffing was of qualified experts.  
Some committees continued their practice of granting jobs as political favors. Id. at 368.  
Dissatisfaction with aspects of the 1946 Act prompted another Joint Committee on the 
Organization of Congress in 1965, which in turn led to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1970.  That legislation tweaked the committee system and provided more resources to the 
Congressional Research Service and GAO. Walter Kravitz, The Advent of the Modern 
Congress:  The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 375, 376–87 
(1990) (describing issues targeted by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970). 
 63. Charles O. Jones, Why Congress Can’t Do Policy Analysis (or Words to That Effect), 
2 POL’Y ANALYSIS 251, 256 (1976); Kevin R. Kosar, The Atrophying of the Congressional 
Research Service’s Role in Supporting Committee Oversight, 64 WAYNE L. REV 149, 152–54 
(2018) (describing the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946’s effects on the CRS). 
 64. Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 (current version codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 65. Kosar, supra note 63, at 155 (describing the 1970 Act’s vision for the CRS). 
 66. Cross & Gluck, supra note 39, at 1561. 
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held in low public esteem.”67  In the decade following the 1970 legislation, 
the CRS staff more than doubled.68  The CRS is nonpartisan and provides its 
policy and legal analysis exclusively to members of Congress.69  It is staffed 
by policy analysts and attorneys, and it produces reports and briefs on topics 
spanning domestic social policy, American law, foreign affairs, science, 
industry, and finance.70  CRS staff also respond to specific requests from 
members or their staff.  In 2019, CRS fielded more than 71,000 research 
requests.71 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 made other notable 
modifications.  It “made changes to the committee system to empower the 
use of expert committee staffers.”72  Congress also realized in the 1970s that 
it needed greater expert assistance on budgetary matters in the wake of 
clashes with Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon over spending 
priorities.  In 1967, President Johnson had assured critics that the Vietnam 
War and his Great Society programs could be financed simultaneously, only 
to turn around and ask for a tax increase to pay for them a year later.73  
President Nixon’s behavior was even more troubling to Congress.  He 
ordered “impoundments”—essentially line-item vetoes through which he 
would refuse to spend money that Congress had appropriated—for social 
programs and demanded that Congress enact spending ceilings, which 
granted him discretion over which programs made the cut.74 
Congress came of the view that it needed its own expert advisers to rival 
presidential budgetary control and the OMB in the executive branch.  
Congress therefore passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974.75  This bipartisan effort passed with large margins, and 
it created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in an attempt to give 
Congress greater expertise to address budgetary matters and provide 
 
 67. Donald Wolfensberger, A Brief History of Congressional Reform Efforts, WILSON 
CTR. (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/brief-history-congressional-
reform-efforts [https://perma.cc/8ERS-Z7AS]. 
 68. Cross & Gluck, supra note 39, at 1561–62. 
 69. Congressional Research Service:  Careers, LIBR. OF CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/ [https://perma.cc/C59Y-WSCR] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021); 
Congressional Research Service:  History and Mission, LIBR. OF CONG., 
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/history.html [https://perma.cc/3XBW-L2MJ] (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2021). 
 70. Congressional Research Service:  Areas of Research, LIBR. OF CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/research/ [https://perma.cc/UXW5-GYBU] (last visited Oct. 29, 
2021); see also Cross & Gluck, supra note 39, at 1562 (providing additional detail on CRS 
staffing). 
 71. Cross & Gluck, supra note 39, at 1563. 
 72. Id. at 1559. 
 73. PHILIP G. JOYCE, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE:  HONEST NUMBERS, POWER 
AND POLICYMAKING 15 (2011). 
 74. Id. at 15–16. 
 75. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (current version codified in scattered sections of 2 
and 31 U.S.C.); JOYCE, supra note 73, at 15–18. 
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information on the fiscal impacts of its policies.76  According to the Senate 
report, “the [CBO] is the result of the Committees’ belief that Congress needs 
a highly competent staff to guide it in fiscal policy and budgetary 
considerations, similar in expertise to the President’s Office of Management 
and Budget.”77 
The CBO analyzes budget and economic issues for proposed legislation 
and is largely staffed by economists and analysts, who are hired on a 
nonpartisan basis.78  The CBO not only reacts to issues that arise but 
proactively “anticipate[s] issues that would be the subject of congressional 
policymaking” and issues relevant reports.79  CBO reports have allowed for 
extensive congressional engagement and resistance to the economic agendas 
of virtually every president since its creation.80  The reports have sometimes 
halted legislation in its tracks and have often helped shape legislation to 
conform to a prescribed fiscal limit.81  The CBO has been credited with 
enabling Congress to take a multiyear perspective of policy decisions rather 
than overemphasizing single year impacts on the deficit.82  The CBO is also 
credited with keeping the OMB honest because it performs similar analyses 
that act as a check on how much the executive branch can play with 
budgetary figures.83  Despite pressure from some members at various points 
to support their agenda items, the CBO refuses to issue policy 
recommendations and will provide only narrow “technical” 
recommendations when specifically requested.84 
The 1970s also witnessed the creation of the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA), which was tasked with providing Congress with 
nonpartisan analysis of issues related to technology and science.85  
Technology issues were at the forefront of public consciousness during the 
 
 76. See Cross & Gluck, supra note 39, at 1574–75 (describing the passage of the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and its support in Congress). 
 77. JOYCE, supra note 73, at 17 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-579, at 31 (1973)).  The Act also 
continued in the 1946 Act’s path of tweaking the committee system, this time by curbing the 
power of the influential chairs of committees and formally moving subcommittees under the 
supervision of their committees, thus preventing them from growing too autonomous. Kravitz, 
supra note 62, at 376–77. 
 78. Introduction to CBO, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/about/overview 
[https://perma.cc/AG8J-DAL8] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 79. JOYCE, supra note 73, at 27–28. 
 80. See id. at 208–09 (describing the CBO’s influence on economic policy during the 
Reagan, Obama, and Clinton administrations); id. at 34 (same regarding the Carter 
administration). 
 81. See id. at 232 (“[T]here is no question that information provided by CBO on the costs 
of policies can have a substantial effect on the design of those policies.  Sometimes the effect 
may be to stop legislation from moving, such as reportedly happened particularly during the 
BEA period.  On at least as many occasions, the effect is to change the structure of the policies 
to make them fit within some prescribed fiscal limit.”). 
 82. Id. at 221. 
 83. Id. at 210 (describing the CBO-OMB dynamic). 
 84. See id. at 29 (describing the CBO’s nonpartisan identity). 
 85. The OTA Legacy, OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/ 
[https://perma.cc/K9WV-VQNZ] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
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middle of the century, from the Cold War arms and space races to Ralph 
Nader’s efforts on automobile safety and concerns about chemical pollution 
inspired by the book Silent Spring.86  Congress was eager to legislate on these 
issues but had a difficult time sorting through complex and often one-sided 
input from academics, corporations, and activist groups.87  Congress’s lack 
of technology expertise also made it difficult to provide meaningful oversight 
to the technical work of executive agencies.88  Congress was unsatisfied 
relying on the president’s science advisers and wanted independent advice.89  
When a congressional subcommittee began considering a bill that would 
create the OTA, corporate executives mobilized to oppose it, fearing that it 
would lead to burdensome regulation.90  The OTA ultimately had less 
bipartisan support than the GAO, CBO, or CRS, with roughly half of House 
Republicans opposed to it.91  Senator Ted Kennedy, who became the first 
chair of the OTA’s board, explained the rationale for Democratic support:  
“without [the] OTA, the role of Congress in national science policy would 
become more and more perfunctory and more and more dependent on 
administration facts and figures, with little opportunity for independent 
congressional evaluation.”92  Republicans, however, were split on whether 
to support the OTA because many of them were worried that the agency had 
too much power to set policies that would have negative economic effects.93  
Though the agency was itself bipartisan, with a board comprised of members 
of both parties from both the House and the Senate, it struggled in its initial 
years to shake the perception that it was an agency dominated by 
Democrats.94 
The OTA published more than 750 reports that took a range of forms.95  
Some focused on a particular technology, such as a 1983 report on the 
 
 86. See Jathan Sadowski, Office of Technology Assessment:  History, Implementation, and 
Participatory Critique, 42 TECH. SOCIETY 9, 11–12 (2015) (describing early technology 
assessment reports). 
 87. See id. at 11. (“It soon became apparent to Congress that when confronting 
technological issues, such as the infamous debate about supersonic transport (SST), it was 
difficult to parse out all the varied and opposing viewpoints that stemmed from the private 
sector and the academy.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 12–13 (describing congressional positions on technology assessment in the 
1960s and 1970s). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 14 (“This amended bill with a revamped, bipartisan [board] was enough to 
appease legislators in Congress.  ‘The House then approved the amended bill on a roll call 
vote of 256–118, with Democrats clearly favoring the bill 180–39, while Republicans were 
split 76–79.  The Senate passed the bill on a voice vote and President Nixon signed the bill 
into law on October 13, 1972.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Gregory C. Kunkle, New 
Challenge or the Past Revisited?:  The Office of Technology Assessment in Historical Context, 
17 TECH. SOCIETY 175 (1995))).  
 92. Id. at 13. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 14. 
 95. See id. at 15–16 (describing the publication and use of OTA reports). 
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validity and utility of polygraph tests.96  The report concluded that the tests 
had significant margins of error, laying the groundwork for legislation, 
passed in 1988, which strictly limited the use of polygraphs by employers.97  
Other reports considered specific government programs, such as a 1994 
report analyzing a plan to upgrade the Social Security Administration’s 
computer system.98  The GAO had already weighed in with concerns; the 
OTA report supported the overall idea but emphasized how the government 
had to develop its expectations and uses for the new system—insights that 
are credited with saving hundreds of millions of dollars in the ultimate 
implementation.99  The OTA reports have been cited years after their initial 
publication,100 and the OTA inspired the creation of several agencies in 
Europe in its image.101 
That proved to be the peak of the path toward greater expertise and fact 
gathering in Congress.102 
B.  The Ebbing of Expertise in Congress 
Things took a sharp turn in 1994 when Newt Gingrich led a new wave of 
Republicans into office to take control of the House of Representatives from 
Democrats for the first time in forty years.  This new wave of Republican 
candidates did not believe there were sufficient incentives for bipartisanship 
and believed there were greater rewards from voters for attacking Congress 
and government itself.103  Many ran on a platform that criticized Congress 
for its wasteful spending,104 and they immediately made drastic cuts when 
they took over.105  Gingrich started his tenure as Speaker of the House with 
 
 96. Adam Keiper, Science and Congress, 7 NEW ATLANTIS 19, 33 (2005). 
 97. Id. (describing the OTA report’s findings as a basis for enacting the Employee 
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 101. See Mooney, supra note 100, at 44–45 (describing the UK and Germany launching 
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a goal to “ma[k]e Congress dumb — on purpose.”106  Gingrich believed 
nonpartisan experts were actually “a third column of liberals pretending to 
be experts.”107 
Guided by that world view, Republicans proceeded to cut congressional 
professional staff by one-third.108  They slashed the budgets of the CRS, the 
CBO, and the GAO.109  The staff of all three agencies dropped 40 percent 
from 1980 to 2015,110 with the biggest shift occurring when Republicans 
took over the House in 1995.111  Under Gingrich’s leadership, Republicans 
cut the staff at the GAO and CRS by a third.112  The GAO at one time had 
15,000 employees, but that has plummeted to 3000.113  Agency staff levels 
in Congress have remained “more or less at the level [Gingrich] helped cut 
them to.”114  The CRS budget has remained flat and outpaced by inflation for 
much of the past two decades.115  The CRS has significantly decreased its 
engagement with congressional committees, in large part because of the 
reduction in the number of substantive, bipartisan hearings, but also because 
of a desire not to appear partisan and to be assisting a committee dominated 
by one party.116 
The Republicans went even further with the OTA, completely defunding 
it and shutting it down.117  Republican anger at the OTA can be traced to its 
 
Congress’s independent research bodies, forcing lawmakers to instead rely on lobbyists for 
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critiques of President Ronald Reagan’s space-missile defense system, the 
feasibility of which the OTA concluded was “so remote that it should not 
serve as the basis of public expectation or national policy.”118  The OTA’s 
assessment upset the Reagan administration, officials at the Pentagon, and 
other conservatives.119  By the time Gingrich and his Republican colleagues 
came to power in 1994, they were still rankled by the report and had the OTA 
in their crosshairs.120  One former OTA director called the push to end the 
agency “Reagan’s revenge” for the fallout of the missile report.121  Gingrich 
and his followers alternately described the agency as overly political, too 
slow to be useful to Congress, and not worth the funding.122  The cost 
argument divided Republicans because many moderates felt the $21 million 
per year budget was worth the benefits.123  What seemed to appeal most to 
Republicans was the ability to find their own experts to support their 
positions instead of having them rejected by the OTA.  As Gingrich put it, 
“[w]e constantly found scientists who thought what [the] [OTA reports] were 
saying was not correct.”124  Norm Ornstein has called the end of the OTA 
“the death knell for nonpartisan respect for science in the political arena, both 
changing the debate and discourse on issues like climate change, and also 
helping show in the contemporary era of ‘truthiness,’ in which repeated 
assertion trumps facts.”125 
The CBO and JCT have suffered the least and still play an influential role 
in analyzing legislation.126  But they, too, have seen their roles diminish over 
time.  Congress still cares about the JCT’s revenue estimates, but the JCT 
plays less of a role in developing tax legislation in the first instance, with 
partisan committee staff on the Ways and Means and Finance Committees 




 118. Sadowski, supra note 86, at 15. 
 119. See Mooney, supra note 100, at 44–45 (describing conservative responses to the 
OTA’s assessments of the missile program). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 44. 
 122. Id. at 45. 
 123. See id. (describing different Republican perspectives on cutting the agency’s budget). 
 124. Jim Dawson, Legislation to Revive OTA Focuses on Science Advice to Congress, 
PHYSICS TODAY (Oct. 1, 2001), https://physicstoday.scitation.org/doi/10.1063/1.1420545 
[https://perma.cc/JF5W-UXBN] (third alteration in original). 
 125. Ornstein, supra note 108. 
 126. See Cross & Gluck, supra note 39, at 1553, 1575, 1580; George K. Yin, Crafting 
Structural Tax Legislation in a Highly Polarized Congress, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 
253–54 (2018) (showing little reduction in staff at the JCT). 
 127. Yin, supra note 126, at 264; see also Susan Webb Hammond, Recent Research on 
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which the JCT “staff’s influence in developing tax legislation has been 
overshadowed” by more partisan actors.128 
Republicans have also become more vocal in their criticism of the JCT and 
CBO.  After the CBO issued a negative estimate of a farm bill, for example, 
the Republican chair of the House Committee on the Budget stated that “[t]he 
CBO sucks, and you can quote me on that.”129  Republicans particularly 
dislike the fact that the CBO uses static economic models because they do 
not think that methodology gives enough credit for what they believe are “the 
positive economic effects of Republican policies, such as tax cuts.”130  To 
address this, when the CBO forecasts turn out to be inaccurate, Republicans 
present those mistakes as evidence of problems with the agency’s scoring.131  
Republicans have also attempted to appoint a director of the CBO who would 
change the agency’s analysis to be more favorable to their positions.  Though 
their eventual appointees did not do much to change the agency’s practices, 
the effort has created an appearance of greater partisanship at the CBO.132 
Republicans were particularly vocal in their opposition to the CBO and the 
JCT in 2017.  After a CBO report found that Republican proposals to 
overhaul the Affordable Care Act133 would result in twenty-three million 
more Americans becoming uninsured, many conservative Republicans called 
for budget cuts to the agency.134  Newt Gingrich, then an adviser to President 
Donald Trump, labeled the CBO a “left-wing, corrupt, bureaucratic defender 
of big government and liberalism.”135  In the wake of the JCT’s score of the 
2017 tax legislation, which showed the Senate plan would not pay for itself 
but instead add $1 trillion to the federal budget deficit, Republicans “opened 
an assault” on the JCT.136  They made a “concerted push” to “discredit a 
nonpartisan agency they had long praised.”137  Senator Bob Corker said that 
he believed Congress should “have a real debate and . . . have real economists 
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weighing in and we should take other things into account other than Joint Tax 
and C.B.O.”138  In fact, “no credible, independent analyses” backed up the 
claim Republicans made that the tax cuts would pay for themselves with 
economic growth.139  The criticism was, according to The New York Times, 
the “latest example of Republican lawmakers muddying the waters on 
empirical research in an effort to boost their policy agendas.”140  Republicans 
similarly attacked the CRS for a critical report issued in 2019 assessing the 
effects of 2017 tax reform legislation.141  In this environment, it is no surprise 
that people working in Congress report that “nonpartisan staff are being 
impugned” and worry about the efforts to “minimize CBO and GAO and 
other organizations” doing expert work inside Congress.142 
Although Republicans have led the charge on most of the cuts, Democrats 
have sometimes been part of efforts to cut back on Congress’s expert 
advisers, particularly the GAO.  A Senate appropriations subcommittee 
sought to cut the GAO’s 2012 budget by 9 percent, or $50 million, which 
was eventually pared back to $35 million.143  The subcommittee’s 
Democratic chairman justified the move by saying that he “intend[s] to put 
the interests of Nebraska taxpayers ahead of Washington bureaucrats and 
make cuts where we can.”144  This proposal drew a strong rebuke from 
Republican Senator Tom Coburn who observed: 
The irony [of proposing cuts now] is Congress needs GAO’s assistance 
now more than ever.  If the mission of GAO is compromised by excessive 
cuts, where else can Congress turn to find unbiased data to improve 
programs and save money? . . .  [The cuts] could very well hobble the one 
agency that members of both parties have long trusted for thoughtful 
recommendations . . . .145 
Coburn added, “[f]or nearly 90 years, GAO has served as a vital arm of 
Congress, helping it keep close tabs on federal spending.  Without it, 
Congress would have difficulty performing its constitutional role of 
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shrinking-gao-budget-concerns-employees-oversight-advocates/ [https://perma.cc/Y6WE-
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 144. Id. (quoting Senator Ben Nelson). 
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overseeing the Executive Branch.”146  In 1997, a Democrat from California, 
Representative Vic Fazio, tried to eliminate funding that would have 
increased the JCT staff by twelve because he “claimed the panel had swerved 
from its nonpartisan roots to become an advocacy arm for the Republican 
majority in charge of the House Ways and Means Committee.”147 
More typically, however, it has been the Republicans proposing the 
diminishment of expert bodies in Congress.  According to Professors Lee 
Drutman and Steven Teles, “the decades-long diminishment of nonpartisan 
expertise in Congress has gone hand in hand with the rise of conservative 
power.  Ideologically or lobbyist-driven legislation moves faster through the 
process when there are fewer knowledgeable, nonpartisan staffers asking 
inconvenient questions.”148 
The House of Representatives under Gingrich’s leadership stripped all 
funding from legislative service organizations (LSOs).  LSOs were voluntary 
caucuses of representatives interested in learning more and communicating 
with other legislators about particular issues.  Some of the LSOs centered on 
regional issues, whereas others focused on topics that cut across geography, 
like poverty or the arts.149  Before Gingrich ended support for LSOs, they 
had received limited resources, including an office and access to 
communications and research resources.150  They were restricted from 
receiving outside funds to maintain their independence from interest 
groups.151  LSOs were perceived as being more of a Democratic institution 
because many of them were founded and approved under Democratic control 
of the House, and the Black and Hispanic LSOs featured more Democrats.152  
One of the Gingrich House’s first actions was to defund the LSOs and order 
them to return any unused funds to the Treasury to “reduce the national 
debt.”153 
The frequency and use of hearings have followed a similar pattern of 
decline.  After a peak in the 1970s, hearings declined through the 1990s, 
plateauing at around one thousand per year in the House, and continuing to 
decline in the Senate since then.154  Perhaps even more significant than the 
declining number is the content.  Hearings have become far more partisan.  
Previously, hearings were considered methods for lawmakers to gather 
information, engage in debate, and help staff get up to speed on a policy issue, 
but now hearings are used to “structure a binary choice and highlight the 
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dimension most amenable to partisan advantage.”155  Now that hearings are 
televised, “lawmakers posture for the cameras and avoid positions that might 
anger interest groups.”156  As lawmaking becomes more partisan, lawmakers 
are more likely to make up their minds before the hearings start, making them 
less inclined to spend time engaging with the substantive issues.157  A 2014 
analysis found that dozens of Representatives attended less than one-third of 
their committee meetings.158  One anonymous member of Congress 
described the situation as they saw it in 2015: 
[M]embers routinely don’t show up at committee hearings, or if they do 
show up, it’s only to ask a few questions and leave.  A lot of members fight 
for committees that will help them raise money or get a sweet lobbying job 
later . . . .  The result is that the engine for informed lawmaking is 
broken.159 
Unsurprisingly, the shift toward partisan hearings has meant a shift in the 
witnesses who testify.160  Instead of focusing on academics and other 
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Perspective, 10 REG. & GOVERNANCE 179, 183 (2016); see also Philip H. Devoe, Opinion, 
Congressional Hearings Need Aggressive Reform, NAT’L REV. (May 5, 2018, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/05/congressional-hearings-need-drastic-reform-
partisan-posturing/ [https://perma.cc/5ELG-DPWS] (“[M]ost such hearings have long been 
hollow partisan charades meant to advance the illusion that the legislative body is actually 
legislating or give the party in control fodder for campaign ads.”); Tevi Troy, Opinion, 
Congressional Hearings Aren’t What They Used To Be.  Here’s How To Make Them Better, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/ 
21/congressional-hearings-arent-what-they-used-to-be-heres-how-to-make-them-
better/?utm_term=.2e39f601e5e2 [https://perma.cc/NNK7-EQ2U] (“For a long time, many 
hearings were bipartisan affairs, with members on both side [sic] of the aisle trying to get to 
the heart of the matter, rather than simply advancing partisan interests.”). 
 156. WILLIAM F. CONNELLY JR. & JOHN J. PITNEY JR., A Return to Madisonian 
Republicanism, in IS CONGRESS BROKEN?:  THE VIRTUES AND DEFECTS OF PARTISANSHIP AND 
GRIDLOCK 213, 222 (William F. Connelly Jr. et al. eds., 2017). 
 157. See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress:  Observations and Lessons 
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1539 (2005) (“Today’s lawmakers . . . 
spend less time sorting out their policy preferences through committee work.  Because they 
are more partisan, they are more likely to know their mind before the start of committee 
deliberations.”). 
 158. Luke Rosiak, Many House Members Miss More Than Two-Thirds of Their Committee 
Meetings, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 29, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/many-house-members-miss-more-than-two-thirds-of-
their-committee-meetings [https://perma.cc/T3SX-FMUJ]. 
 159. MIKE MIESEN ET AL., BELFER CTR., BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY CONGRESS:  IMPROVING 
CONGRESS’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EXPERTISE (2019), https://www.belfercenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/2019-09/ST/Building21stCenturyCongress.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9AA-
NQQ7]. 
 160. For example, one study by a scientific advocacy group found that the percentage of 
witnesses representing industry who were called to testify in front of the House Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology has increased steadily over the past twelve years and that the 
percentage of industry witnesses exceeded academia witnesses for the first time during the 
112th Congress. YOGIN KOTHARI & LINDSEY FONG, CTR. FOR SCI. & DEMOCRACY AT THE 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, ARE PARTISANSHIP AND INDUSTRY INFLUENCE 
COMPROMISING THE MISSION OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE? 1–2 (2014). 
 
1050 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
subject-matter specialists, Congress is now more likely to pick witnesses 
based on their partisan leanings.161  A CRS report found that committees 
sometimes selectively invite witnesses to represent “only particular points of 
view.”162  Even the experts themselves view their invitations to testify in a 
partisan light.163  This phenomenon is consistent with the increasing 
frequency of “positional” hearings, in which legislators hear from only one 
side of the debate and the discussion is aimed at advocacy rather than fact 
gathering.164  According to one study, positional hearings have risen in 
frequency from 19 percent in the 1970s to 34 percent in the early 2000s.165  
At the same time, hearings on the whole are on a decline,166 and the hearings 
that are held focus less often on solutions.167 
The decline in the use of and deference to experts can be seen in a host of 
ways beyond their diminishing role at hearings and the shrinking role of the 
expert agencies within Congress.  First, committees play less of an 
informational role than they used to in the legislative process.  Committees 
have traditionally taken the lead in gathering research and facts about a 
particular issue,168 but committees and subcommittees have been meeting 
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less often in both houses of Congress.169  In 1958, congressional committees 
met almost three times more often than they did in 2010.170  In addition, more 
bills are bypassing committee consideration altogether.  Prior to the 1970s, 
nearly all legislation considered on the floors of both chambers was reported 
out of committee.171  In 2013 and 2014, over half of the legislation heard on 
the floor of the Senate, and about 40 percent in the House, bypassed 
committee.172 
Now committees perform more of a partisan role.173  Professor George Yin 
explains the changes in the context of the Ways and Means Committee, 
which “has traditionally been the venue to develop virtually all serious tax 
legislation.”174  While previously the committee consisted of senior members 
with safe seats “to enable them to follow a norm of restrained partisanship in 
their committee work,” now “newer members from competitive districts are 
assigned to the committee to give them an electoral and fund-raising boost” 
while the power of the committee “has largely been transferred to party 
leaders.”175  Thus, when Congress considered the repeal and replacement of 
the Affordable Care Act in 2017, “important legislation affecting millions of 
Americans, committee involvement in both the House and Senate was 
essentially nonexistent.”176  When Congress passed the massive 2017 tax 
bill, “potentially affecting every person and business in the country,” it 
followed the same path.177  Neither the House nor the Senate convened a 
single committee meeting after the legislation was introduced, and the Senate 
approved the almost 500-page bill from the House within hours of receiving 
it.178  Yin contrasts that with the last major rewrite of the tax laws in 1986, 
when the House Ways and Means Committee held thirty days of full 
committee hearings and ten days of subcommittee hearings and when the 
Senate Finance Committee held thirty-six days of full committee hearings 
and six days of subcommittee hearings.179  As Yin notes, 
[t]he demise of the committees has meant a loss of deliberation and 
legislative expertise.  The “hard work” of legislating that has mostly been 
performed by the committees—identifying and investigating problems, 
devising and analyzing possible solutions, obtaining and evaluating input 
from the public and outside experts, debating solutions and reaching 
compromises during markups, floor debate, and conferences, and drafting 
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careful legislative language to reflect the intended solution—has simply 
become more and more rare in today’s Congress.180 
There has also been a reduction in committee staff,181 so even in the 
relatively rare instance when issues do go through committee, they receive 
less vetting than they previously did.  House committees have 50 percent 
fewer employees and Senate committees have 20 percent fewer employees 
than they did in 1985.182  A big shift came in 1995 when the Republican 
House cut professional staff (such as lawyers, economists, and investigators 
working within committee) by a third.183  Republican House members also 
drastically altered the House’s committee structure—concentrating power 
within the House speaker’s office and limiting members’ and their staff’s 
independent research capacity.184  By 2009, every House standing committee 
had fewer staffers than it did in 1994.185 
A larger percentage of the overall staff in Congress now works for 
individual members of Congress or the leadership team, as opposed to the 
committees.186  Between 1979 and 2009, House leadership staff grew by 253 
percent, and Senate leadership staff grew by 340 percent.187  Personal staff 
members tend to be generalists who share the ideological views of the 
member of Congress for whom they work, whereas committee staff often 
have specialized knowledge in a field.188  Even when congressional leaders 
hire staff based on expertise in a particular area, these experienced staffers 
work primarily to advance the partisan goals of the leadership.  Again, this 
makes it that much harder for biases or predispositions to be challenged by 
relevant data or facts. 
Congressional staff recognize there is a problem.  While 81 percent of 
congressional staffers polled consider high-quality, nonpartisan policy 
expertise to be “very important” to the effective functioning of their chamber, 
only 24 percent stated that they were “very satisfied” with the quality and 
quantity of nonpartisan expertise that they have access to.189  A study by the 
Congressional Management Foundation of survey responses from senior 
staff found that senior staff believe that Congress lacks the proper “staff 
knowledge, skills and abilities,” as there is continuous staff turnover and 
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there is a “lack [of] necessary time and resources to understand, consider and 
deliberate public policy and legislation.”190  The survey also showed that 
staff wanted to “improve Member and staff access to high quality, 
nonpartisan policy expertise within the Legislative Branch.”191 
The sharpest drop may have been in 1995, but the cuts have not stopped 
since then.  Between 1993 and 2010, Congress’s full-time researchers 
dropped from 6166 to 4000, with the GAO cutting more than 2000 staffers 
and the CRS losing 20 percent of its capacity.192  In 2017, a shrinking GAO 
budget193 caused the agency’s full-time staff to drop below 3000 for the first 
time since 1935.194  Staffing at the CBO has remained relatively stable over 
the years,195 but members of Congress have grown increasingly critical of its 
projections and analysis when the CBO’s budget scores conflict with their 
legislative goals, as was the case in 2017 when Republican leadership 
disputed the CBO analysis of what would happen if the Affordable Care Act 
were repealed.196 
Instead of relying on these agencies and their objective analysis of data, 
legislators get their information from think tanks, interest groups, and 
lobbyists who tend to share the general ideological outlook of the 
members.197  That is not a surprise because these congressional agencies 
developed in the first instance to provide unbiased views and act as a 
safeguard against interest group pressures.198  Thus, as the congressional 
sources of expert judgment diminish, the power of the interest groups 
increases.  Commentators have observed that “it is not a coincidence the 
demand for ‘revolving door lobbyists’ has grown . . . .  In effect, Congress 
has outsourced its analytic capacity to K street lobbyists working for special 
interests, rather than internally delegating it to staff working for members’ 
constituents.”199  Indeed, in 2013, Congress spent around $2 billion funding 
the entire House and Senate, while lobbying expenditures exceeded $3.2 
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billion (a six-fold increase from the mid-1980s).200  Privately funded think 
tanks have acquired an enormous presence over the years.  As of 2013, 1828 
think tanks existed in the United States, many of which were funded by 
industry, labor, or partisan donors.201  Within Washington, D.C., think tanks 
more than tripled from 1970 to 1996 (rising from one hundred to 306).202  
Moreover, many of these think tanks employ former congressional staffers, 
whose familiarity with the legislative branch enables special interest groups 
to gain an outsized advantage in the lawmaking process.203  Without 
adequate capacity to conduct its own nonpartisan research, Congress cannot 
challenge the claims made by the powerful interests and think tanks.204 
The current lack of expert-driven decision-making in Congress is thus the 
product of larger patterns.  With the rise of partisan politics and unified party 
orthodoxy, it becomes less important for Congress to have its own base of 
experts to counter the executive.  Either Congress is of the same party as the 
president, in which case it goes along with the president’s platform, or it is 
controlled by the opposition, in which case it opposes the president’s 
platform, regardless of the underlying facts or expert views.  It is partisanship 
all the way down.205  In the 1940s, when the first Reorganization Act was 
passed, Congress felt a greater need to keep control over the executive 
because there was not the same sense of a unified party platform.206  
Likewise, legislation in the 1970s grew out of a dissatisfaction with President 
Nixon’s “imperial presidency” that garnered support from both the 
Democratic majority and some Republicans.207  But we no longer live in an 
era with that kind of intraparty diversity, so we do not have much bipartisan 
pursuit of policies backed by the best evidence.  Moreover, as Professors 
Levinson and Pildes note, “there is reason to expect that the parties will 
remain internally cohesive and ideologically distant for the foreseeable 
future.”208 
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Congress has grown more polarized and divided, with a steady increase in 
polarization since the 1970s and 1980s.209  Representatives and senators 
increasingly vote in unison along party lines.210  There is far less compromise 
and instead politicians on both sides of the aisle make much greater use of 
tools to block the other party’s goals, regardless of merit.211  This includes a 
greater incidence of the use of tactics such as “repeal of just-enacted statutes, 
coordinated challenges to their constitutionality, and denial of funds for 
implementation.”212  Senate and House counsel have participated less 
frequently in litigation because they cannot meet the statutorily required 
threshold of “broad bipartisan support,” and instead, there has been an 
increase in partisan amicus filings by parties.213  To some extent, the 
increasing polarization in Congress reflects increased polarization among the 
public at large,214 but studies indicate that politicians are even more polarized 
than the general public.215 
Another key shift is the dominant role played by special interest groups 
and financial contributions.216  Money buys access because politicians who 
want to be reelected want to keep the groups who fund them happy.217  
Interest groups, for the most part, do not target all legislators equally.  
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Instead, they want to talk to those predisposed to agree with them and do not 
spend their time trying to convince others who generally disagree with 
them.218  The result is an echo chamber where politicians meet with people 
who share their views and get little pushback on their positions. 
In this kind of climate, there is little need for objective expert views.  There 
is just one side versus the other, and the current institutional design and 
staffing in Congress reflect that.  The flaws in congressional decision-making 
and Congress’s declining use of experts do not just affect the legislative 
process and the content of our laws.  Because members of Congress speak 
about issues and policies based on this skewed set of information, they in 
turn influence how voters view those same issues.  This can create a vicious 
circle where voters demand policies based on misleading factual 
assumptions, and legislators respond to those same outlier examples by 
reinforcing the view that they are typical.219 
II.  CONGRESSIONAL DECISION-MAKING WITHOUT EXPERTISE 
There is a larger trend in society of discounting or ignoring expert 
assessments or empirical evidence,220 but this part focuses on the particularly 
damaging effects the lack of expert agencies and staff has on the legislative 
process given the partisan pressures in that context.  It then looks to criminal 
law policymaking as a case study of what the process looks like with and 
without expert involvement to show how the role of experts can improve 
policy even in a hyperpartisan environment. 
A.  Cognitive Bias in the Legislative Process 
First, let’s consider the decision-making process for the average member 
of Congress.  Cognitive psychologists have taught us a great deal over the 
past several decades about how human beings make decisions.221  There are 
two main cognitive strategies that humans use to process information 
efficiently given the competing stimuli and demands on our thought 
processes.  First, people use heuristics, which are types of mental shortcuts, 
to allow information to be processed quickly.222  Heuristics have been 
characterized as “simple rules of thumb that facilitate rapid, almost reflexive, 
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information processing.”223  Second, humans organize incoming information 
into preexisting organizing principles known as schemas.  A schema is “a 
scripted set of default information and organizational themes that help people 
focus on the information most likely to be relevant, thereby allowing them to 
ignore information likely to be irrelevant.”224  “[S]chemas influence every 
feature of human cognition, affecting not only what information receives 
attention, but also how that information is categorized, what inferences are 
drawn from it, and what is or is not remembered.”225  While these tools help 
us to process vast amounts of information, they also lead to “systematic errors 
in judgment.”226  These can include, for example, overstating an event’s 
likelihood or making racially prejudicial assumptions. 
Legislators, like the rest of us, have to rely on heuristics to make decisions.  
The pressing demands of a legislator’s job make the use of heuristics 
inevitable.227  But we know from cognitive psychology that heuristics often 
lead to inferior decisions because of the way they influence the thought 
process; in the legislative context, that can mean inferior policymaking that 
affects all of us. 
Several heuristics are especially likely to apply to legislators.  First, “the 
availability heuristic, which is the tendency to estimate the importance and 
frequency of an event based upon how easy it is to recall examples of it,”228 
is likely to play a powerful role in legislative thinking.  Because legislators 
have so many competing demands on their time, they typically lack the time 
to carefully study the underlying facts and research on a given issue.  Nor do 
they get feedback on how their policies are being applied from day to day.  
Instead, events that get widespread press coverage or are raised by 
constituents are likely to play an oversized role in their thinking, and they 
may assume those events are more typical or common than underlying factual 
research would indicate.229  While this heuristic (like others) is likely to be 
prevalent across a range of subjects, it will be particularly potent when a 
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subject is emotional, such that overestimation of a perceived risk is “heavily 
influenced by mental images of possible outcomes.”230 
One key method for counteracting bias is to make sure that people making 
decisions encounter relevant information that is inconsistent with their 
preconceived notions.231  Commentators have pointed out that exposure to 
stereotype-incongruent exemplars can counter implicit associations people 
may otherwise have, including about racial and ethnic groups.  Bias occurs 
in part because common narratives put forth by the media tend to strengthen 
the link between certain groups and negative behaviors.  For example, stories 
about Black people or immigrants committing crime or about certain racial 
minorities committing welfare fraud can forge a link in people’s minds that 
those behaviors are associated with those groups.232 
It is thus helpful to present narratives that break those linkages to “recode” 
how people think about certain groups and associated behaviors.233  The 
implication of this research might suggest that exposing legislative 
decision-makers to different types of people can have a debiasing effect when 
they are debating policy.234  That means effort should be made to have 
diverse witnesses at legislative hearings and for diverse constituents to meet 
with their representatives.  But there are limits to a strategy based in giving 
legislators greater exposure to different narratives and perspectives.  Some 
researchers report smaller debiasing effects than predicted, in part because 
any temporary exposure to stereotype-incongruent exemplars is often 
overpowered by the daily, schema-consistent narratives found in mass 
media.235  The effect of direct contact with stereotype-incongruent exemplars 
has been modest because of the daily, real-life exposure that rebiases people 
shortly after the initial debiasing.236  Rebiasing is likely to be strong in 
Congress because of the partisanship that exists there and the fact that 
Congress does not get a steady stream of debiasing examples to consider. 
Legislators might also start with a preconceived idea about how something 
is working, which in turn serves as an anchor for their subsequent thought 
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processes. Or legislators may have a fixed idea about a particular sentence 
someone should receive for crime X, which in turn anchors their views about 
crime Y.  This dynamic is known as anchoring.237   
Because legislators operate in a world of partisan politics, they are also 
particularly susceptible to “availability cascades,” in which increasing 
numbers of people accept imperfect information as true because other people 
believe it.238  A Republican, for example, is likely to accept what a group of 
Republicans is thinking, just as a Democrat is likely to accept what other 
Democrats are thinking.  And the more members of a political party speak 
only to those who share their views, they are likely to gravitate toward more 
extreme positions because of a phenomenon known as group polarization, 
which is when like-minded people in a group tend toward extremes.239 
Legislators may also be prone to confirmation bias, which occurs when 
they seek out information that confirms their preexisting beliefs but ignore 
information that undercuts those views.240  Relatedly, legislators may engage 
in biased fact assimilation or motivated reasoning, whereby they view 
confirming evidence at face value but subject disconfirming evidence to far 
more critical evaluation or ignore it.241  All people engage in motivated 
reasoning and suffer from confirmation bias, but legislators may be 
especially likely to succumb to these psychological pressures because they 
outwardly take positions and do not want to have to walk them back or be 
viewed as someone who waffles or made previous errors that they must 
account for. 
The use of schemas can also lead legislators to make systemic errors in 
judgment.  One aspect of the use of schemas involves framing effects, or “the 
tendency to treat potential gains differently from potential losses.”242  In 
particular, people tend to be risk averse about losses, so they will focus more 
on avoiding potential harms than on the benefits they forgo if they do not 
take action.  Legislators thus may be prone to avoiding taking actions that 
could produce immediate harms, even if those same actions would produce 
greater benefits in the long term.  For example, legislators may resist passing 
a criminal justice reform measure that would reduce the sentences of people 
currently serving time in prison, for fear that a person might commit a crime 
upon release.  That potential harm will weigh heavily on their minds even 
 
 237. Why We Tend to Rely Heavily Upon the First Piece of Information We Receive, 
DECISION LAB, https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/anchoring-bias/ [https://perma.cc/BEH2-
57WV] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 238. Lucas & Tasic, supra note 228, at 223.  See generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). 
 239. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?:  Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE 
L.J. 71, 74–77 (2000). 
 240. See Lucas & Tasic, supra note 228, at 225–26; Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation 
Bias:  A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 175, 175 (1998). 
 241. See Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite:  A Corrective Strategy for Social 
Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1231, 1232 (1984); Lucas & Tasic, supra note 
228, at 226. 
 242. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 10, at 557. 
 
1060 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
when, overall, a sentencing reduction would produce greater public safety 
benefits because most people released will not commit additional crimes, 
their earlier release could ease their reentry into society, and the resources 
saved could be used for more productive public safety efforts. 
Legislators, like everyone, may also suffer from “focusing illusion,” 
whereby they passively accept the frame or characterization of the problem 
that is provided to them and “restrict their thoughts to salient situational 
elements.”243  So if legislators are presented with stories of immigrants or 
Black people committing crimes, they may have associations between certain 
ethnic and racial groups with those activities that then guide their thinking 
about those issues going forward.  This is especially so if the legislator is not 
a member of the minority group, because people suffer from in-group bias, 
“a readiness to reduce society to us and them.”244 
The “determined other effect,” where “any determined target evokes a 
stronger emotional reaction than an undetermined target,”245 also plays a role 
in legislators’ thought process, and again, the power of that effect will be 
strongest when victims are part of the legislator’s in-group.  This helps 
explain why narratives of particular crime victims often motivate legislative 
responses tailored to those specific victims instead of considering a problem 
at a greater level of generality.246 
Finally, it should be noted that the people elected to serve as legislators 
may win their elections precisely because they reflect the same biases as the 
people who vote for them.247  “Not only will their message resonate, but these 
politicians will appear more genuine than will rational, well-informed 
politicians who recognize bad policies but pretend otherwise in order to get 
elected.”248 
All of these biases thus combine with partisan incentives to create an 
environment where policymaking is likely to be driven by interest groups and 
instincts.  But some scholars have argued that Congress has the capacity to 
overcome this.  In a pathbreaking article on the relationship between 
cognitive psychology and optimal government design, Professor Jeffrey 
Rachlinski and Cynthia Farina argue that, despite the various cognitive biases 
that legislators might use in their decision-making, Congress nevertheless has 
a relative advantage over the courts and the president because it has “greater 
potential than any of the other key constitutional actors for creating expertise 
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within itself and structuring its processes to correct for errors.”249  They 
based their view on the fact that Congress can make use of expert assistance 
through specialized committees that give its members relevant experience 
over time250 and the institutional memory of those who work there on 
substantive issues.251  They believed expert congressional agencies like the 
GAO could further act as valuable checks against cognitive bias because they 
“will likely adopt a different decisionmaking perspective on the problems 
they are asked to address, providing at least the opportunity for Congress to 
expose itself to novel perspectives ‘outside’ the immediate decisions it must 
make.”252 
The key lesson of Part I is that these mechanisms are falling into disuse, 
which means Congress’s relative institutional advantage at overcoming 
biased decision-making no longer holds.  In a world in which Congress 
dismisses the value of expertise, it may no longer be the case that it retains 
its advantages over the courts and the executive branch in the battle against 
cognitive bias.  To be sure, there may be other reasons to prefer Congress as 
a policymaking body—perhaps because of its greater accountability to 
constituents—but its supposed advantages as a superior substantive policy 
maker have dissipated.253 
Indeed, Congress may operate at a policymaking disadvantage because 
unlike the executive and judicial branches—which see how policies apply to 
real-world cases and facts on a regular basis—Congress only gets a wholesale 
view of any problem.  To the extent Congress sees retail examples, they are 
all the handpicked outliers of partisans seeking to make a predetermined 
point.  There is thus no feedback mechanism in place that challenges the 
assumptions or biases of members of Congress.  Instead, they get examples 
that just confirm the biases they already have.  Partisanship and bias therefore 
align to create an environment that is particularly ill-suited for arriving at the 
best policy based on objective evidence. 
B.  Criminal Law and Policy as a Case Study 
One can see the danger of a legislative process that fails to consider 
empirical information by looking at Congress’s approach to criminal laws.  
This is a space where Congress has never really made use of expert 
assessment or shown regard for empirical facts or studies.  Indeed, there is 
perhaps no area where partisan incentives and cognitive bias triumph over 
objective analysis more than in legislation surrounding criminal law.  There 
are countless examples of legislators’ and voters’ conceptions of what a 
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typical crime or criminal in a given category looks like then dictating their 
choices thereafter, even when the facts are otherwise.254  This is not 
surprising given that scholars have found that newly presented risks and 
increases in the level of known risks “tend to generate extreme responses” 
and “create pressure for alarmist government regulations.”255  Crime is an 
area where new risks constantly present themselves—either with new drugs 
or certain criminal behaviors—and where existing risks always seem to be 
increasing because of the way the media covers crime.  The lead story on the 
local news is typically a crime story and studies have found roughly one third 
of all local television news stories are about crime.256  The number of stories 
in the media about crime either increases or stays constant, even when crime 
itself is declining.257  The risk of crime thus appears ever-present, and with 
it, the pressure for government action. 
Congress’s reaction to the emergence of crack cocaine in the 1980s is a 
perfect example.  In the wake of media reports characterizing crack as more 
dangerous than other drugs and after the well-publicized death of basketball 
star Len Bias of what was believed to be a crack cocaine overdose, Congress 
rushed to pass crack penalties.258  Representative Tip O’Neill, the Speaker 
of the House from Massachusetts, essentially started a bidding war on crack 
penalties, in large part because the Boston Celtics drafted Bias to join the 
team before his death.259  Congress viewed crack through a schema that 
presented it as a drug associated with unprecedented danger and violence.260  
This led to what would become known as the 100-to-1 ratio between powder 
and crack cocaine.  Under Congress’s framework, the mere possession of five 
grams of crack yielded a mandatory minimum sentence of five years and 
possession of fifty grams of crack (an amount associated with trafficking) 
yielded a ten-year mandatory minimum.261  It would take one hundred times 
those quantities for someone to receive the same sentence for powder 
cocaine.262  Congress relied on media accounts and did not bother to seek 
expert guidance.  Congress did not even ask its newly created U.S. 
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Sentencing Commission to study the issue.263  In the words of one 
representative:  “We initially came out of committee with a 20-to-1 ratio.  By 
the time we finished on the floor, it was 100-to-1.  We didn’t really have an 
evidentiary basis for it.”264 
If Congress had bothered to seek expert guidance, they would have 
discovered that crack and powder are indistinguishable on all the relevant 
measures they focused on.  The two drugs have indistinguishable 
pharmacological effects, “crack is no more addictive than powder cocaine,” 
and individuals using “crack are no more likely to have violent reactions than 
those who use powder cocaine.”265  If they had engaged in an inquiry instead 
of going off their assumptions, they would have further learned that Bias had 
overdosed on powder, not crack, cocaine.  And if they took the time to study 
how their proposed law would apply, they would have discovered grotesque 
racial disparities in treating crack and powder so differently.  In 2013, 83 
percent of those charged with crack trafficking offenses were Black, but only 
5.8 percent were white.266  In contrast, Black people comprised only 31.5 
percent of powder cocaine trafficking offenders, Hispanic people made up 
58 percent, and white people made up 9.4 percent.267  It took more than 
twenty-four years for Congress to reduce the disparity between crack and 
powder, and even then it was not to a 1-to-1 ratio, but to an 18-to-1 ratio.268 
Crack was initially penalized so harshly and continually treated as such for 
decades because legislators had an image in mind of crack as an especially 
dangerous drug associated with violence given news stories associating the 
drug with violent acts.  The availability heuristic meant Bias’s death and 
news stories of violence dominated their thinking, and they overestimated the 
dangers of crack.  And in the absence of hearings or consultation with 
experts, no other information could break through to change their course.  
Legislators continued to keep crack sentences high, likely in part because of 
the endowment effect and the fact that they did not want to roll back the long 
sentences they already put on the books, which would make it look like 
people were getting out too early.  To be sure, even an expert consultation 
might not have prompted a 1-to-1 ratio.  But discovering that the two drugs 
are indistinguishable on the relevant measures and getting accurate 
predictions of the racial bias might have tempered the leanings of many 
members and at least reduced that disparity. 
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Nor has crack been unique in terms of how Congress approaches drug 
policy.  The entire field is largely based on anecdotes and assumptions.  
Congress established severe mandatory minimum penalties for drugs 
assuming they would apply to high-level traffickers and kingpins and failed 
to consult with experts or the Sentencing Commission to learn how they 
would actually operate.269  The result is that most people sentenced to 
mandatory minimums are actually low-level members of drug conspiracies.  
Of the people in federal prison serving sentences for drug crimes, only 14 
percent of these individuals were identified as being the manager, leader, or 
organizer that the law’s drafters had in mind, and yet they are serving 
sentences of eleven years on average.270  One reason that legislators failed to 
appreciate how their new law would apply is that they were not thinking 
about how conspiracy law would affect their decisions and they did not ask 
an expert agency or anyone else with the relevant knowledge. 
In just about every area where Congress considers legislation dealing with 
crime, it relies heavily on narratives of egregious cases but fails to consider 
data or facts, even when the stated goal is public safety and a broader 
consideration of facts would suggest a different approach to maximize public 
safety.  Consider, for example, Congress’s decision to expand sex offender 
registration requirements to juvenile offenders.271  The act imposing this 
requirement was named after Amy Zyla, and her story of being sexually 
assaulted by a juvenile offender who went on to reoffend after being released 
was front and center in the discussion of the law.272  The determined other 
effect operated in full force, as legislators were motivated to remedy what 
happened to Amy and subsequent victims of her attacker.  But is a 
notification approach the right one to stop these crimes from being 
committed?  Would putting children on sex offender registries stop more 
crime or would it make it more likely that those children go on to reoffend 
because of what being on the registry would do to their own prospects of 
reentry?  One would expect a legislative body to want expert assessment of 
these questions, but that was not part of their inquiry.  In fact, there were just 
a couple brief statements expressing concerns about the proposed legislation 
and the wisdom of putting “13 and 14 year olds” on registries.273 
If members of Congress had considered or cared about the effectiveness 
of sex offender registries, they would have discovered a wealth of empirical 
data casting doubt on their utility.274  Similarly, they would have found that 
 
 269. Barkow, supra note 260, at 216–17. 
 270. See CHARLES COLSON TASK FORCE ON FED. CORR., TRANSFORMING PRISONS, 
RESTORING LIVES 11–12 (2016). 
 271. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 272. 152 CONG. REC. 2974–75 (2006) (statement of Rep. Mark Green). 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries:  Fear Without Function?, 54 U. CHI. 
J.L. & ECON. 207, 235 (2011); Amy Baron-Evans, Still Time to Rethink the Misguided 
 
2021] THE WHOLESALE PROBLEM WITH CONGRESS 1065 
the federal classifications that place offenders into different tiers based on 
legislators’ views of risk275 actually do a poor job of predicting recidivism 
when compared to state approaches and actuarial predictors.276  If legislators 
would have explored the science of juvenile brain development, they 
likewise would have discovered that treating that population the same as 
adult sex offenders makes no sense given biological differences in how 
juveniles reason about risk and crime and that a focus on rehabilitation is far 
more likely to reduce recidivism among that population.277 
We see similar shortcomings in decision-making when Congress 
considered changes to bail practices in the 1980s.  The Bail Reform Act of 
1984278 created significant changes in the federal bail and pretrial detention 
statutory scheme originally enacted in the Bail Reform Act of 1966.279  
Among other things, the Act allowed judges far greater leeway to detain 
defendants before their trials if they posed a risk to public safety.280  
Legislators had certain stories in mind and told them during the debate.  Thus, 
Senator Orrin Hatch spoke of violent crimes committed by people awaiting 
trial, including “a 17-year-old [who] was apprehended for the fatal shooting 
of a 68-year-old in the course of a robbery” and who “had two armed robbery 
cases pending at the time of the killing.”281  Senator Hatch’s final story was 
particularly intended to invoke anger and concern, as it involved a defendant 
who was out on bail for a stabbing with intent to kill yet had committed a 
nearly identical crime shortly after release: 
[A] defendant stabbed a man at a bar who refused to buy him a drink.  This 
victim is still only barely clinging to life in a hospital intensive care unit.  
At the time of the crime, the defendant was on pretrial release for another 
incident in the same bar under identical circumstances.  In addition, he was 
under grand jury investigation for at least one other unprovoked 
stabbing.282 
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The goal of reducing pretrial crime and violence is laudable, but any 
assessment of pretrial detention should consider whether detention itself 
poses public safety risks—and we have ample evidence that it does.  Pretrial 
detention often means the person being held loses a job, housing, or even 
custody of a child because so many people who are detained are already 
living on the margins.283  These pressures mean that those detained pretrial 
are more likely to plead guilty (regardless of their crime or actual guilt).284  
Those detained pretrial also serve longer sentences than otherwise similarly 
situated people who are released pretrial, perhaps because it is more difficult 
for them to work with lawyers in defending themselves.285  Whatever the 
reason, the increased likelihood of incarceration costs money that could be 
better spent elsewhere.  But far more relevant to any consideration of pretrial 
detention is that pretrial detention itself—regardless of the underlying crime 
and holding other factors constant—leads to more crime later.  Studies have 
found that incarcerating individuals before trial was associated with a 30 
percent increase in felonies and a 20 percent increase in misdemeanors 
eighteen months after their hearing.286 
A process that sets pretrial detention policy without even considering these 
tradeoffs is thus fundamentally flawed if the goal is public safety.  
Interestingly, Senator Hatch noted that he told stories of people committing 
crimes while released before trial precisely because he wanted them to 
motivate the debate “so that [Congress does] not make the mistake of 
concentrating on statistics that fail to account for the human suffering 
involved in crime.”287  Presumably Hatch was referring to statistics that show 
that most people released before trial do not commit crimes.  But if the goal 
is minimizing human suffering and reducing crime, legislators cannot ignore 
the costs of pretrial detention, including the costs to public safety.  An expert 
assessing all the data with a goal toward maximizing public safety would 
likely have limited pretrial detention more than the ultimate legislation did. 
Because most politicians have no expertise or training in criminal justice 
policy, they may be unaware of the downsides and tradeoffs of more punitive 
policies such as longer sentences, registries, and pretrial detention.288  They 
are setting criminal justice policies as a general matter and are often 
responding to particularly heinous cases or press accounts, which they often 
discuss at length in their floor debates and discussions of proposed laws.  
What they are not doing is consulting any expert body or individual who 
studies the area to see what the most effective policy would be. 
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Federal criminal law is a cautionary tale of what happens when Congress 
cares little about what experts have to say.  But it also shows how expertise 
can help improve policymaking and that partisanship does not have to operate 
without any checks by expert assessments.  Even in this space—which has 
been as politicized as any—experts have made a difference where they have 
been allowed to operate and were consulted.  In recent years, Congress has 
paid more attention to the Sentencing Commission and its recidivism studies 
and data.  After the Commission lowered crack sentences under the 
Sentencing Guidelines and applied its changes retroactively in 2007, 
Congress followed suit and lowered the legislative 100-to-1 ratio between 
powder and crack cocaine in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.289  Seeing that 
crack penalties could be lowered without negative consequences influenced 
Congress’s decision, as did the voluminous record the Commission 
assembled over the years showing that crack penalties overstated the relative 
harm of the drug and created huge racial disparities in sentencing. 
Congress has also been influenced by Commission recidivism studies in 
the wake of Guideline sentencing reductions.  The Commission studied 
people who received lower crack sentences after its 2007 changes over a 
five-year period and compared them to a similarly situated group that served 
their sentences in full because they were no longer incarcerated when the 
Commission made its change.290  The Commission found no statistically 
significant difference in recidivism rates between the two groups.291  These 
results paved the way for the Commission to lower all federal drug sentences 
and make those changes retroactive in 2014, ultimately allowing 30,000 
people to receive average sentencing reductions of more than two years.292  
Following the blueprint of its crack sentencing changes, the Commission 
analyzed recidivism rates of those who received the retroactive reductions 
and compared them to a similarly situated group of individuals who served 
their sentences in full, and again the Commission found no statistically 
significant difference between the two groups.293 
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These empirical studies proved critical to the passage of the First Step Act 
of 2018294 and its provisions that made the 2010 changes to the crack/powder 
disparity retroactive.295  The Commission’s recidivism studies showed that 
longer sentences were not necessary for greater deterrence, thus pushing back 
on a common congressional assumption.296  Congress also sought out data 
from the Commission on who would be covered by various changes to 
mandatory minimum sentences and the safety valve that makes the 
mandatory sentences inapplicable to certain cases.297  This information was 
critical to getting enough votes for the legislation to pass.  So, too, were 
hearings and reports on problems with compassionate release as it was then 
operating.298  Congress may have assumed that the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) was the right gatekeeper to make sure people were not being released 
from prison in the absence of real need, but the reports and hearings on the 
topic showed that the BOP was turning away just about everyone, leaving 
sick and vulnerable people to die in prison when they were in fact the very 
candidates Congress initially had in mind when it created the compassionate 
release law.299  The Commission’s analysis of this issue, along with reports 
from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, greatly 
influenced the congressional debate and subsequent legislation.300 
The moral of the story is that having experts involved in policymaking can 
and does change content, even with political pressures doing most of the 
work.  The absence of expert consultation can yield policies that fail to 
achieve their objective or that are centered around outlier cases and ill-suited 
for most contexts.  To be sure, expertise will not always or even typically be 
enough to overcome partisanship and interest group pressures.  But it often 
makes a difference.  Experts can help shape laws for the better and overcome 
misimpressions and biases that members of Congress bring to the process.  
That is why Professors Jesse Cross and Abbe Gluck tout the congressional 
bureaucracy as a “counterweight to hyper-partisanship.”301  The experts in 
Congress can have just that effect. 
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And that is precisely why the decline in Congress’s substantive expertise 
infrastructure is so disconcerting.302  In the absence of data, 
evidence-gathering, and a process that seeks to gather objective assessments, 
sensationalized stories and narratives drive policies, and the result is that 
those policies can be ill-fitting to the real world in which they need to apply. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
What, if anything, should be done about the lack of respect for substantive 
expertise and neutral fact-finding by Congress?  This part considers this 
question in two contexts.  Part III.A asks what Congress could or should do 
because it remains up to Congress what process it will follow.  Part III.B asks 
whether there are or should be any doctrinal implications if Congress stays 
on the present course and continues to devalue internal expertise in its 
decision-making.  In particular, Part III.B turns to the implications for the 
debate over the status of the nondelegation doctrine and for statutory 
interpretation. 
A.  Reforming Congress 
The history of the use of experts in Congress shows that at various points, 
Congress has recognized their value.  It is therefore worth asking whether it 
is possible to return to a model of greater substantive committee involvement, 
more staffing and support for the expert bodies that legislators in Congress 
previously consulted, and better use of objective witnesses and consultants 
who have expertise in an area and are not associated with extreme partisan 
views. 
One factor pointing in favor of that possibility is that key actors in 
Congress realize there is a problem.  A 2017 survey of current and former 
members of Congress and congressional staffers found that most respondents 
considered access to nonpartisan policy expertise in the legislative branch 
“very important,” but only a quarter were “very satisfied” with the current 
situation.303  In early 2019, the House of Representatives created a bipartisan 
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Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress,304 and Democratic 
Representative Bill Pascrell observed at one of their hearings that Congress 
had become “feeble . . . from deliberate institutional vandalism.”305  He 
called for skilled congressional staff so that they would not be “overwhelmed 
by the army of corporate lobbyists roaming our halls and a world growing 
more socially, economically, and technologically complex at a stunning 
rate.”306  But thus far, the Committee’s recommendations have focused more 
on technology and transparency reforms rather than reinvigorating the use of 
experts.307 
Analysts and commentators outside of Congress have also pushed for 
greater legislative expertise.  Some ex-congresspeople working as lobbyists 
have also made recommendations for Congress to increase funding for 
agencies like GAO and CRS, increase the funding available for congressional 
staffers, and shift power back toward committees.308  Many congressional 
observers have called for recreating the OTA.309  Others have called for 
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improving legislative outcomes by letting experts do more of the talking at 
committee hearings310 or by bringing back LSOs.311 
Although the need for expertise is recognized, there is little sign that the 
political will exists to fix the problem.  Thus far, efforts to reinvigorate 
expertise in Congress have failed.  There have been regular calls for the 
recreation of a technology agency like the OTA that have gone nowhere.  
During the George W. Bush administration, former Representative Rush 
Holt, a Democrat, introduced several bills that proposed reviving the OTA in 
some form, but to no avail.312  Similar efforts continued into the 2010s, 
slowly picking up more support, but still falling short.313 
The prospect of a resurgence in expertise holding weight in Congress 
seems unlikely particularly when one considers what prompted Congress to 
place greater weight on expertise throughout its history.  When Congress 
initially created expert agencies, the common driving force that emerged was 
a concern with checking executive overreach.  Calls for increasing staff today 
are often based on the same concern with having greater legislative capacity 
for oversight over the executive branch.314  But in an age of party control, 
separation of powers and interbranch conflict has taken a backseat.  As 
Professors Daryl Levinson and Rick Pildes put it, “political competition in 
government often tracks party lines more than branch ones.”315  A 
Democratically-controlled Congress is thus unlikely to be concerned with 
checking a Democratic president.  Instead, it seems far more likely that all 
the partisan pressures will continue to lead members of Congress to turn to 
partisan think tanks, lobbyists, and activists for policy assessments instead of 
consulting neutral experts or trying to find bipartisan consensus based on the 
best available evidence. 
That said, the fact that the JCT and CBO continue to play an important role 
in the congressional process suggests that there are still sufficient incentives 
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for Congress to have an independent source of information about budget and 
tax issues beyond what OMB and Treasury, respectively, produce.  Perhaps 
each party recognizes the value in having these resources when they do not 
hold the presidency and want to be able to check executive overreach.  
Perhaps fiscal concerns are sufficiently bipartisan that these independent 
nonpartisan sources of expertise retain their value and can survive (so far, at 
least) attacks on them.  Whatever the reason, these agencies, while 
diminished, continue at least for now to retain their importance to members 
of Congress. 
And their continued existence offers some hope that other expert bodies 
can be rejuvenated.  If this happens, it will likely need to be championed by 
Democrats, just as Republicans championed the diminishment of these 
agencies.  When we have seen calls for the rejuvenation of expert agencies 
in Congress, the ideas have largely been spearheaded by Democrats, though 
they have attracted a limited degree of Republican support.316  Perhaps now 
that the Democrats have control of the Senate as well as the House there is a 
greater chance of success, but it is unclear whether the Democrats want to 
use their political capital for the effort.  The key is whether Democrats 
currently in power believe that reenergizing some of these institutions could 
be beneficial for the time when Republicans resume control of the presidency 
and they want to have mechanisms for greater checking in place.  Because 
many of the major Democratic policies align more readily with expert 
evidence, particularly in areas involving science such as climate change, 
having rejuvenated expert bodies in Congress might offer some help in the 
future.  Given the slim margins of Democratic control in the Senate and 
House, it is unclear whether there are enough Democrats who will support a 
broad effort to resuscitate expertise, particularly when that will involve a 
fiscal investment at a time when deficits are soaring and there is a greater 
focus on getting relief to voters struggling from the pandemic. 
In this climate, Democrats might want to consider a more targeted effort 
at reinvigorating nonpartisan expert assessments in the legislative process.  
To that end, they should consider what kind of expert assessment and 
forecasting is likely to appeal most to their voters and therefore be worth 
whatever expenditure is required.  Racial impact is high on the list given 
pervasive inequality and President Joe Biden’s explicit commitment to 
addressing structural racism and staying true to the diverse voting coalition 
that supported him.  In that vein, Democrats might want to use some of their 
political capital to get more expert assessments of how legislation they are 
considering will affect different communities.  CBO and JCT reports remain 
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the most influential substantive contributions by experts in Congress because 
Congress cares about costs and the budget and knows that voters care about 
the economy, as well.  Because many Democratic voters care about racial 
disparities, this might be the kind of assessment that Democrats are willing 
to use political capital to get passed.  Several states require racial impact 
statements before they pass new criminal law legislation so that legislators 
can consider carefully whether they want to pass laws that will have a 
disproportionate impact.317  Iowa is one such state, and after it required racial 
and ethnic impact statements, proposed legislation with a disproportionate 
impact on minorities was twice as likely to fail relative to proposed 
legislation that was rated as neutral or found to have no such effect.318  So, 
while these kinds of statements do not dictate outcomes, they can have an 
influence.  The key is to get that information into the process, and a modest 
proposal like this might help improve substantive outcomes. 
The other top contender would be the recreation of OTA or something like 
it.  We have reached a juncture where science is politicized, and the 
Democratic Party is the party that believes in it.  In this environment, they 
stand the best chance to push for a new OTA, and they might be able to get 
enough Republicans to support it given the threat of future viruses, the shared 
concern between the two parties of Big Tech dominance, and the increasing 
difficulty in ignoring climate change now that we are having so many 
extreme weather events across the country. 
But if one were to bet, the odds are against rejuvenating OTA or getting 
more expert assessments of racial impact.  These proposals face an uphill 
battle in a partisan body that might be content to just rely on the interest 
groups who support them to tell them what matters.  Any prospect for internal 
congressional action that makes experts a bigger part of any process seems 
unlikely given the political climate right now, though it should be welcomed. 
B.  Doctrinal Implications 
If Congress stays on its present course and continues to devalue expertise 
in its internal processes, there remains the question of whether this could or 
should affect legal doctrine in any way.  This section considers two possible 
areas of law.  The first subsection considers what these shifts in Congress’s 
internal processes mean for administrative law and particularly the 
nondelegation doctrine.  The second subsection asks whether there are or 
should be any shifts in statutory interpretation as a result of these changes. 
1.  Delegation to Agencies 
Congress has already confronted the fact that it sometimes is not the best 
actor to address a policy question.  The creation of the administrative state is 
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a testament to Congress’s acknowledgement of its own limitations.  Congress 
often delegates key policymaking responsibility to expert agencies because 
it believes that will produce better outcomes.  To be sure, there are political 
reasons for this delegation.  Congress is more likely to delegate when the risk 
of a bad policy decision is high, and the payoff for good policy decisions is 
low.319  Congress strategically delegates in “areas least favorable to their 
reelection chances.”320  In keeping with its partisan motivations, Congress 
also delegates more often when the executive branch is controlled by the 
same party.321  And its choice to delegate varies based on which party is in 
power, choosing independent agencies when the opposing party from 
Congress’s majority controls the White House and choosing executive 
agencies when they are from the same party.322 
But Congress is not just pursuing partisan ends when it delegates.  It also 
delegates because of a view that agencies will produce better outcomes given 
their expertise and their processes for gathering the relevant information and 
responding to changes on the ground.323  Delegation to agencies can thus 
inject expertise into decision-making that is otherwise lacking in the 
congressional process.324  One reason why the decline of expertise in 
Congress may be less concerning than it otherwise would be is that we have 
administrative agencies to pick up some of the slack.  Unfortunately, not all 
substantive areas have seen this kind of delegation.  Criminal law, for 
example, has traditionally been a policy space where Congress does not 
bother to delegate because legislators have reaped political rewards for 
passing legislation and do not face much pushback when those policies do 
not do much to advance public safety or result in excess costs.  But in many 
other areas, Congress has seen value in delegating to expert bodies. 
In the typical delegation scenario, Congress focuses on setting the general 
policy goals in a particular area and then leaves the details of the rules and 
policies to best achieve those goals to the relevant institutional actor best 
positioned to set those policies.  Typically, that means delegating authority 
to an agency, staffed with people who have the relevant expertise to sift 
through and process information, the authority to promulgate rules after 
public comment and input, and the obligation to face judicial review for 
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rationality of any of its policies.325  Agencies have to explain their decisions 
and why they rely on certain pieces of evidence and not others to avoid being 
found arbitrary and capricious, and that can have a disciplining effect that 
helps to counter cognitive biases.326  Responding to comments requires the 
agency to consider alternative possibilities and inconsistent information, 
which can help limit bias in their decisions because considering 
counterarguments and alternative positions is one of the most effective 
debiasing strategies, particularly for overcoming biased fact assimilation and 
confirmation bias.327 
This is not to say that agencies do not have biases.  The same expertise that 
gives agencies a broader base of knowledge may also make the people in 
those agencies susceptible to other cognitive errors.  In particular, experts can 
be overconfident in their judgments.328  They can also suffer from tunnel 
vision and “myopically focus on issues within their area of expertise and 
thereby fail to recognize that a decision would benefit from accessing other 
bodies of knowledge or ways of thinking.”329  So while experts are more 
likely to get accurate results than laypeople because of their expertise, they 
will sometimes make mistakes, and when they do, they may be less likely to 
question whether they made a good decision.330 
Aspects of the agency process help to correct for this, however.  Having to 
consider alternative policy approaches and respond to comments helps to 
correct against overconfidence, and explaining why they chose one path over 
another to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs may also help 
curb tunnel vision.331  More fundamentally, the question here is not whether 
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agencies will be perfect decision-makers.  Clearly they will not.  The issue is 
whether they are better suited to make detailed policy prescriptions, guided 
by broad policy goals from Congress, than Congress is on its own.  And what 
we know about the legislative process these days provides ample reason to 
believe agencies will do a better, even if imperfect, job. 
Agencies do not operate on their own, however.  The same judicial review 
that can provide a disciplining effect on agencies might also create 
opportunities for judges to inject biases of their own.  Courts may be less than 
ideally deferential to agency expertise when they are conducting judicial 
review of an agency policy.332  But even when judges strike down agency 
policies as arbitrary and capricious, the agency can still implement them with 
better explanation and record support.  In general, a process that relies on 
comments from all interested parties and the agency explaining its decision 
is likely to be preferable at reducing bias than leaving all the key decisions 
and details with Congress even if the congressional decisions would face less 
scrutiny by judges.  That is why Congress typically uses agencies to fill in 
policy details when there are powerful interest groups on both sides of an 
issue.  Indeed, agencies exist in the first place precisely because Congress 
wanted entities that could engage in “specialized information-gathering.”333 
Those interested in better policymaking should therefore be concerned 
about recent calls for a more robust nondelegation doctrine.  Although the 
Supreme Court has rarely struck down an agency delegation on this basis, 
the doctrine retains life as a canon of interpretation to avoid overly broad 
delegations,334 and at least five Justices on the current Supreme Court have 
sent signals that they might be more willing to resuscitate a more robust 
version of the doctrine.335  While some applaud a stronger nondelegation 
doctrine because they think it will lead Congress to play a greater role in 
policymaking,336 the congressional process is so partisan and ungrounded in 
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empirical facts that it is hard to see this as an unadulterated good.  To be sure, 
one might see congressional decisions as more accountable than agency 
ones—though that is debatable given executive accountability.  But on the 
basis of pure policy analysis, this move would come at a significant 
substantive cost.  Maybe these advocates think Congress would improve its 
policy if it had to take real control over its decisions.  But that is a big gamble 
in the partisan climate in which we currently operate.  Keeping more of the 
policy details with agencies guarantees that the process must be grounded in 
the empirical record, and that may well be why Congress continues to 
delegate.  When Congress believes delegation produces better policies, 
courts should respect that decision.337  Under the doctrine, there must be an 
intelligible principle from Congress.  But when there is, courts should permit 
that congressional call as an example of Congress deciding what produces 
the best policy outcome. 
The same animating principle that sees the policymaking value of giving 
more authority to agencies also applies in some contexts to giving more 
authority to courts.  Criminal law, for example, is an area where Congress 
often faces a question of whether to decide a punishment for itself by making 
it mandatory or giving more discretion to judges.  Mandatory punishments 
set by Congress are ill-advised precisely because they prevent the necessary 
tailoring to specific factual scenarios.  It is far better to adopt a framework 
that allows district judges, who see all the factual nuances of cases and the 
retail application of laws, to adjust as cases come in that are different from 
the schemas that the legislature had in mind. 
The basic idea in both contexts is for Congress to recognize that, as a 
wholesaler, it is limited in its abilities.  Better substantive decision-making 
depends on using all the best available evidence we have about problems.  
Congress should therefore create mechanisms in its laws that allow the other 
branches to adapt to better information in retail applications while still acting 
as faithful agents who help Congress achieve its goals.  If Congress makes 
clear its factual assumptions, these agents can then adapt when the facts on 
the ground prove otherwise.338  This might mean more effort in either 
legislation itself or legislative history to spell out the underlying factual 
predicates or assumptions behind laws and enough discretion vested in 
judges and the executive to make corrections when the assumptions or 
presumed facts prove to be false or incomplete.  While Congress has no 
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obligation to do this to pass constitutional rational basis review, it is a good 
idea as a matter of improving policy outcomes. 
A benefit of giving agencies and the judiciary more flexibility to adjust 
laws based on Congress’s general policy goals is that agencies and the 
judiciary should be getting feedback on how policies are playing out in 
real-world settings.  That kind of feedback loop is typically missing in the 
legislative sphere unless it is an area where a powerful enough group can 
raise a fire alarm that something is going wrong.  But in many areas, the 
targets of legislation, such as criminal defendants, immigrants, and people 
who receive need-based benefits, have little power or sway, and in those 
contexts, fire alarms may be lacking.  Setting up a process that allows an 
agency or the judiciary (whichever body processes that type of case) 
flexibility to adjust policy based on the feedback it is getting from the 
trenches where the law is being applied can help get a better feedback loop 
in place.  And legislators should want such flexibility to make sure their 
statutes are being applied in the ways they expected and not to situations that 
they did not have in mind.339  We have seen federal judges take a far more 
nuanced view of what kinds of people fall within legislative definitions of 
criminal offenders precisely because they see counterexamples in their 
courtrooms. 
To be sure, judicial and political appointees are often put in these posts 
precisely because they have a preexisting schema that corresponds with those 
of the party and politicians who appoint them.340  So this model hardly avoids 
partisanship.  Moreover, while their interaction with more on-the-ground 
cases can help break certain narratives and examples from being the only 
ones in their minds, it is important to note that these courts and agencies can 
have their own biases.341  But in general, these bodies get more feedback on 
how things are working on the ground, and agencies in particular have a 
process well suited for gathering the necessary empirical information to 
guide decision-making even if partisan interests also influence the ultimate 
decision. 
2.  Statutory Interpretation 
In a recent article, Professors Jesse Cross and Abbe Gluck persuasively 
argue that the existence and role of the congressional bureaucracy should 
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have implications for statutory interpretation.342  Though they largely focus 
on the implications of having nonpartisan congressional agencies and staff 
involved in drafting, they also suggest substantive canons, such as 
incorporating assumptions built into CBO budget scores and JCT’s 
understanding of tax laws as part of a statute’s interpretation.343  I agree with 
this suggestion given the central role these congressional agencies continue 
to play—particularly when so many other internal processes have been 
decimated. 
Cross and Gluck’s suggested interpretive canons stem from the positive 
use of these experts within Congress, but one can also argue that the disuse 
of the congressional bureaucracy and failure to consult experts might also aid 
in interpretation.  If the statute is clear, the legislative process will not matter 
one way or another.  But when a statute is not clear, courts traditionally look 
to legislative intent or purpose to help assess a statute’s meaning.  And the 
role—or lack of a role—of experts can help determine what that intent or 
purpose is. 
Consider criminal law.  Courts often assume that Congress would want an 
interpretation of a criminal law that favors the government, perhaps because 
of an assumption that Congress is concerned with public safety more than it 
is concerned with defendants’ rights.344  Given the politics of criminal law, 
it is a safe assumption that Congress is not all that worried about defendants’ 
interests.345  But the assumption that Congress wants the government to be 
able to reach all possible cases does not follow from the fact that Congress 
pays little attention to defendants’ interests.  In fact, Congress is often driven 
by particular outlier cases and has no idea how a law it is passing will apply 
in the vast run of cases because it fails to get any kind of expert forecast or 
analysis of its proposals, as Part II.B explored.  In this environment, 
Congress’s purpose is actually rather narrow and tied to a particular set of 
facts that are driving its decision.  In the absence of clarity that Congress 
means to go further, it makes no sense to interpret statutes with an assumption 
that there is a purpose for the law to be as broad as possible. 
Considering the use (or disuse) of expert assessment thus offers additional 
support for the rule of lenity that gives the benefits of ambiguity to a 
defendant.346  There are many reasons to support this canon,347 but 
congressional process provides yet another.  The cognitive biases that 
legislators exhibit in criminal policymaking and the lack of any expert 
consultation mean that Congress is not doing much evaluating in this context.  
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Using the rule of lenity means that if Congress wants expansive enforcement 
beyond the facts of the cases it is considering and highlighting, it will need 
to make the text of the statute clear to do that work.  Otherwise, it makes no 
sense to treat Congress as following some broader purpose of public safety 
when nothing in the process indicates Congress actively explored how to 
achieve that.  The assumption that reaching as many cases as possible will 
promote public safety is incorrect;348 so without some kind of inquiry into 
how best to balance the criminogenic effects of criminal punishments with 
the goals of the law, there are no grounds for making an assumption about 
how broadly an ambiguous law should reach. 
This kind of interpretive move might extend beyond criminal law to other 
contexts where the legislative history makes clear paradigmatic cases are 
driving policy and where no analysis was done by any key expert body to 
shed light on how far a statute would or should actually reach in practice.  In 
these contexts, when the text is not clear, it makes no sense to give statutes 
expansive readings. 
A benefit of this kind of interpretive rule is that it will force Congress either 
to be clear or to make use of certain processes to get the benefit of the doubt 
and signal that it does intend for a broader interpretation should the language 
not be as clear as it thinks it is.  This interpretive rule thus provides a 
disciplining effect on legislators by making them use a clear statement when 
they want laws to apply more broadly than the specific factual assumptions 
they have in mind or to do some due diligence to understand how its law will 
work in practice before passage to send that same signal. 
CONCLUSION 
We get better decisions when we seek out all the relevant information and 
consult people with expertise in a field.  This is no less true when the 
decisions are made by our elected representatives.  One might think this is 
not controversial, but sadly we are living in strange times.  The very notions 
of knowledge and facts and expertise are viewed by some as negatives,349 
and that is pushing our politics to reject the pursuit of information in 
Congress. 
It may well be that the kind of biased and flawed decision-making we see 
from Congress is precisely the kind that voters prefer because they cannot 
see past their own biases.  To the extent that is true, there is little hope for 
remedying the problems in Congress. 
But as substantive decisions reveal themselves to be problematic, as they 
have, for example, in criminal law, where we now have mass incarceration 
and have criminalized huge segments of the population precisely because of 
a flawed decision-making architecture, it may well be that voters start to 
realize that they could be getting better results.  And one key place to start is 
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to make use of the expertise that is already out there to combat biases that 
lead to failed policies. 
If Congress will not fix itself, it might be time for other institutional actors 
to view its work product differently and reassess how it views delegations or 
to read statutes in light of this change in process.  At a minimum, we should 
recognize the end of the idealized version of Congress as a great deliberative 
body that “refine[s] and enlarge[s] the public views, by passing them through 
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern 
the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice 
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”350  
Madison’s vision of Congress is sadly not the one we live with today, and it 
is time we shift some of our presumptions to recognize that reality. 
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